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Paths to Power:
The Ascendance of Contemporary
Democratic Congressional Leaders

Ira M. Steinberg: University of Connecticut
Advisor: Dr. Evelyn M. Simien: University of Connecticut

Only in modern times have women begun to ascend into the leadership of Congress. While there
has been a great deal of theoretical work on gender and on Congressional leadership, there have not been
enough actual female leaders in Congress to perform a study until now. The present study examines the
impact of gender, committee/legislative performance, ideology, and fundraising ability on leadership
ascendancy. The variables are investigated through a comparative case study of Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Rep.
Rosa DeLauro, Sen. Hillary Clinton and Sen. Harry Reid.

Woodrow Wilson said “When you come into the presence of a leader of men, you
know that you have come into the presence of fire.” In that quote, Wilson, a scholar of
Congress and legislative government, attempted to capture the mystique and aura that
surrounds Congressional leaders and powerful people. I will be the first to admit that I
too have been captivated by legislative leadership and the people who exhibit it. There
are others like me though, which means the subject of legislative leadership has been
studied previously.

However, until now there have not been female Congressional

leaders and so the present study fills a void in the literature. Examining factors that
contribute to the rise of these leaders over other potential candidates, I gain insight into
factors are critical in the ascendance of Democratic members of Congress. The study
3

takes the form of a comparative case study of Sen. Harry Reid, Sen. Hillary Clinton, Rep.
Nancy Pelosi and Rep. Rosa DeLauro; all four have recently ascended into the official or
unofficial leadership of the Democratic Party in Congress. At the heart of my thesis are
answers to several questions: What factors affect leadership ascendancy? How have
those factors inhibited ascension? What is the relative importance of competing factors?
To what extent does gender play a role in leadership ascendancy?
This thesis does not, and cannot, claim to provide the conclusive answers to the
questions I have suggested. By studying only four individuals, the sample is too small to
make conclusive statements about the relationship between gender and leadership.
However, this study aims to provide an initial test of the applicability of theories of
gender and leadership to current leaders. As women are beginning ascend to previously
unachieved heights within Congress, this study takes a preliminary look at their
ascendancy in order to begin to form the basis of future research into the changing nature
of gender in Congress.
Despite being unable to draw conclusions with the certainty that a more
quantitative study might allow with a larger number of cases might allow, this study
provides information important for understanding not just the subjects being examined,
but Congress as a whole. In writing this thesis, I understand that much can be learned
about Congress by looking at it from the top-down. This does not mean that I understand
Congress purely as a function of its leaders. To the contrary, I look at the leadership and
their career paths as much can be learned about Congress. Knowing what types of
potential leaders were embraced by the whole of Congress and which potential leaders
were rejected by Congress provides a great deal of insight into the culture and norms of
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Congress. Therefore, while in some ways this thesis is about the impact of several
independent variables on the ascendancy of four people, it is also about the place of those
four variables within the culture, norms, and operations of Congress.
In examining the ascendancy of the four subjects of this study it was necessary to
identify several variables that would affect the ascendancy of a Congressional leader.
These four independent variables are variables whose importance has been verified by
scholars and whose importance to understanding Congress is well understood. It is
important to note that these variables are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for
leadership ascendance.
The first independent variable is ideology.

Were the current leaders picked

because they are charismatic leaders of the ideological and intellectual foundations of the
modern Democratic Party? Are more polarizing individuals being passed over for
leadership positions in favor of more centrist and consensus building leaders? Recent
leaders have not been consistently centrist or ideological firebrands. I intend to examine
whether or not the ideological position of the current leaders influenced their rise to
power.
The second independent variable is fund raising ability. Current party leaders are
expected to raise large sums of money for their party and for fellow members of
Congress. I will determine whether leaders are being chosen on the basis of their ability
to raise funds for the Democratic Party or if their fund raising ability is merely an effect
of being selected to the leadership. For example, it is no secret that Rep. Nancy Pelosi
has been and continues to raise large sums of money. It is worth researching if that had
anything to do with her or any of the other leaders rise to power.
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The third variable is committee placement and legislative effectiveness. It is a
well known fact that placement on a powerful committee is necessary to become a major
“player” in Congress. It is also vital to perform well on committee and demonstrate that
you have political savvy to become a leader in Congress. Therefore, I will examine the
relationship between committee placement/performance and leadership ascendancy.
The fourth independent variable is gender. A number of women have risen to
positions of leadership, including Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Rosa DeLauro and Sen.
Hillary Clinton. It is worth researching the effect of gender on their ascendancy. I will
discern whether gender effects leadership ascendancy, by determining its role in the
leadership ascendancy among Congressional Democrats.
Since legislative leadership has substantial influence on public policy outcomes
and legislative decision-making it is therefore worth studying. My research seeks to
examine the leadership ascendancy of recent Democratic leaders in Congress.

I

investigate ideology, fund raising, committee placement/performance and gender in an
effort to develop a model of predictive value that explains leadership ascendancy.
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Literature Review

As in almost all other political phenomena, the explanation of leadership
ascendancy involves a combination of several variables. Drawing from such seminal
works as Davidson’s and Oleszek’s Congress and Its Members (2000) and Rosenthal’s
Women Transforming Congress (2002), several variables have been identified as
essential to leadership ascendancy. The variables are gender, ideology, fund-raising
ability, and committee placement.
Within the last decade, a new wave of Democrats has risen to positions of official
and unofficial leadership in Congress. Official leadership positions, defined by Robnett
(1996), are those positions that are institutionally recognized positions within
organizations which entail intrinsic powers over subordinates. Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Sen.
Harry Reid, and Rep. Rosa DeLauro are examples of official leaders who hold formal
leadership titles as House Minority Leader, Senate Minority Leader, and Assistant to the
Democratic Leader, respectively. Unofficial leaders, as defined by Robnett (1996), are
those that those that yield power and influence over subordinates and other members of
Congress, though they hold no institutionally recognized titles. Sen. Hillary Clinton and
Rep. DeLauro are examples of unofficial leaders in that they hold the positions of Junior
Senator from New York and Assistant to the Democratic Leader, though they wield far
more power than those positions would normally carry. Both the official and unofficial
leaders in my comparative case study have been able to use their positions to shape
legislative debates and policy making.
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Committee Membership/Effectiveness
In order to build a coalition, members of Congress must give other members
reasons to join them. As Bawn (1998) points out in her work on the utility maximizing
model of leadership selection, there is a substantial cost to being on the wrong side of a
leadership contest.

There must be a strong incentive to support a prospective leader,

especially if it is unclear that he or she will win.

Committee membership, like

fundraising, provides members of Congress with incentives to distribute in order to
increase the benefit a member would gain from supporting them.
Arnold and King (2002) in their collaborative work directly link power and
legislative prestige to committee placement. By analyzing the effects of an all male
Senate Judiciary Committee had on the Clarence Thomas investigation1, they drew
conclusions about the importance of representation not just in Congress, but in important
committees. They concluded that had there been more representation of women on the
Senate Judiciary Committee the investigation would have been more effective. Without
the perspective of people who could have been victims of sexual harassment themselves,
the committee lacked needed perspective in the investigation. While their research was
fairly specific it reveals important issues in how committee placement and congressional
power correlate.

Women lacked the prestige and power to have a voice in that

congressional investigation because they lacked membership on the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
Research by Norton (1995) suggests that Arnold and King’s findings about the
importance of representation on committee can be generalized beyond any specific case –

1

Clarence Thomas, then a nominee to the Supreme Court was being investigated for allegedly sexually
harassing a law professor, Anita Hill.
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for example, the Hill-Thomas episode. Norton shows this by demonstrating that the vast
majority of legislative work, especially in the House of Representatives, occurs in the
area of committees and subcommittees. For members of Congress to “make a name” for
themselves they must show that they, as Lyndon Johnson said about power, “…know
where to look for it, and how to use it” (Caro, 2002). Therefore Norton’s theory would
state that committee work is a vital avenue for establishing the prestige and power needed
to pursue leadership positions in Congress.
The legislative process requires more than just committee work though. One
must effectively work with members of Congress outside of their committee. Outside of
one’s committee there are numerous “players” in the legislative process. Degregorio
(1995) studied the reputation of different players in the legislative proves within
Congress. He discovered that members of Congress are more known for their political
savvy and ability than they are for their particular expertise. Skillful political activity
within a committee earns members the reputation needed to raise themselves to positions
of legislative leadership. Therefore, Degregerio (1995) would agree with Norton (1995)
that in order to gain the power and prestige needed to be a leader, members must prove
their effectiveness in committee.
Owens (1997) studied the relationship between party leadership and committee
leadership. He concludes that there is far more coordination between the party leadership
and committee leadership than there has been before. The independence of Committee
Chairman has been decreased, and as a result the Committee Chairmen are more in step
with the legislative priorities and initiatives of the party leadership. To rise to power, a
member of Congress must collaborate with the party leadership and other major players.
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They often need to do so by using their committee seat to steer favors and assist others so
they can obtain reciprocated favors. Since committee leaders and partisan leaders such as
the Majority/Minority Leader are growing closer, the jump from committee leadership to
party leadership has become smaller. Thus, I can expect that Congressional leaders hold
seats on major committees and have been able to effectively use their committee
positions to extend their influence.

Ideology
There are three main theories with respect to the effect of ideology and leadership
ascendancy: the middleman theory, the policy-deviant model, and the utility maximizing
model. The middleman theory is the conventional one often applied to a variety of
electoral and consensus based situations (Clauson and Wilcox, 1998). The middleman
theory suggests that the ideology of the leader is likely to be the median position among
the electing constituency. For example, a Senate Minority Leader should represent the
median ideology of the minority party.

This theory assumes that all leadership

preferences are of the same intensity and given equal consideration in the selection of a
leader. Put more simply, the middleman theory downplays the role of other variables that
give a faction disproportionate power over the selection of the leader, such as fundraising
and gender (Clauson and Wilcox, 1998). The middleman theory is a logical starting point
since leaders build a coalition from the center of their electing constituency. If the
middleman theory is completely accurate, other variables such as fundraising and gender
will be less important.

10

Clauson and Wilcox (1998) pose a second theory, which is known as the policy
deviant model. The policy-deviant model posits that since legislative leaders and their
selectors are concerned with reelection and reselection as leaders they cannot stray too far
from the median ideology of their constituency while establishing their leadership.
Leaders and their selectors will therefore ignore small but persistent “policy-deviants”
that lie far outside of the mainstream (Clauson and Wilcox, 1998). The result will be a
leader who does not occupy the true ideological median. Instead he/she moves toward
the direction of the mode ideological score.
The third model put forth by Bawn (2002) is the utility maximizing model.
Bawn’s model states that varying levels of utility, or value, gained from selecting a
certain leader, outside of the potential leader’s ideology can affect their election. Bawn’s
model, unlike previous models, questions the assumption that all preferences are held
with equal intensity and that equal consideration is given to all positions. The utility
model can bring a more (or less) centrist leader into power since a variety of other factors
are introduced that could trump the importance of having a leader that represents the
ideological median of the electing constituency. For example, someone who differs from
the ideological median and mode could still ascend if their position or status yields a high
level of utility in the form of fund-raising, electoral success or other important goals.
It is important to mention that these models are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Given the situation, different models can interact and co-exist. In the Senate,
for example, the value placed on compromise and consensus will likely weaken the
applicability of the utility-maximizing model. This result will lead not to a choice
between the middleman theory and the policy-deviant theory but a tension between them.
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No single model will dominate. Instead it is quite possible for a leader who is close to
the median to ignore voters who are far off of the median such as conservative Democrats
or liberal Republicans. In essence all three models attempt to explain the composition of
ideological coalitions important for electing leaders and that there is no single method for
explaining the formation of that coalition.

Fundraising Ability
To build the coalition necessary to be a congressional leader, it is important to
have an incentive to attract supporters. Raising money for one’s self and for the party is
one way that members of Congress create incentives for supporting them. Larson (2004),
in his study of incumbent contributions to their party’s central congressional campaign
fund, pointed out that through the 1990s organizations like the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (DCCC) have become increasingly important.

As these

organizations have become more important, donating excess funds to create support
incentives and demonstrate the political skill necessary to raise large sums of money has
become more important. The process has come a long way since Lyndon Johnson’s aides
flew around the country in the 1950s with envelopes of money for struggling candidates.
Today it is far more formalized and necessary for leadership ascendancy (Caro, 2002).
As mentioned earlier, Bawn (1998) points out that legislative leaders have two
goals: first, to be reselected as the leaders, and second, to keep or restore their party to
power. Raising large sums of money for their party and its congressional campaign
committee assists in forming a large coalition as well as achieving electoral success. The
utility-maximizing theory supports the notion that fundraising and ascendancy are
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positively linked. By raising more money for the party, other members of the party will
benefit from that leader’s ascendancy and thus be more likely to support that leader.
Other theories concerning ascendancy though, specifically the middleman theory
suggests that being a top fundraiser is not absolutely essential to leadership ascendancy.

Gender
There exists, for women in politics, a paradox. Though 51% of the US population
is female according to the 2000 census (Smith and Spraggins, 2001), and women have
been voting in equal or higher numbers than men since the 1980s, women have been
underrepresented in Congress (Bennett and Bennett, 1999). Three explanations that
seemingly explain the under-representation of women in politics are sex-role
socialization, structural factors, and situational factors (Bennett, 44; Klein, 1984).
Sex-role socialization is the way men and women are taught what their “proper”
role should be in society with respect to political participation. Women who are active
and assert themselves in American political processes risk being perceived as violating
the norms established by sex-role socialization, which could ultimately inhibit their
leadership ascendance. According to Bennett and Bennett (1999) and Klein (1984),
through various agents such as parents, political leaders, the media and religious
institutions, young girls are socialized to assume a passive role in the political process.
Structural factors are the socioeconomic factors that make it possible for women
to participate in the political process. These factors can include education, income and
employment (Bennett and Bennett, 1999; Klein, 1984). Research by Bennett and Bennett
(1999) shows that education, income and employment status generally correlate
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positively with political participation.

Differences between men and women in

socioeconomic factors could account for differences in political participation (Verba, Nie,
Scholzman, 1994). If women lack the resources and the ability to run for Congress or
partake in the numerous activities needed to accumulate political power, then they will be
inhibited from ascending to position of meaningful political influence.
Situational factors are factors such as marital status and motherhood that make it
difficult for women to participate in the political process (Bennett and Bennett, 1999).
By consuming large amounts of time and money, situational factors could prevent
women from devoting the necessary time and resources to politics to run for Congress
and be a Congressional leader. The under-representation of women in Congress could
therefore be explained by the different situational factors confronting women in
Congress.
Recent research by Linda and Stephen Bennett (1999) ranks the importance of
socialization, structural and situational factors. Using a multivariate regression analysis,
they found that such socializing factors such as religious intensity and youth culture, as
well as structural issues such as education and income, were the most important in
shaping attitudes about the political participation of women. This research indicates that
women who ascend in Congress will have to face obstacles with respect to religion and
gender roles as well as structural issues such as education, employment and income in
order to ascend.
Hawkesworth (2003), for example, conducted a hermeneutic study of interview
data from women-minority members of Congress during the time welfare reform was
being proposed in 1993 and 1994. As Hawkesworth (2003) points out role perceptions
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and discrimination still taints the work of Congress. She uncovered in her research,
systematic and chronic marginalization and stereotyping of women of color in Congress
through the denial of credit for their achievements and the institutional “invisibility” of
women and minorities in Congress. By making it hard for women to be noticed for their
achievements, and for their priorities to be discussed and voted on, marginalization hurts
women who wish to ascend in Congress by making it difficult for them to be perceived as
tough, savvy, and accomplished political operators in Congress.
Hawkesworth’s (2003) important theoretical contribution to gender studies is
complemented by the work of Whicker and Whitaker (199) on women in Congress.
Whicker and Whitaker studied characteristics of female members of Congress such as
region, committee assignment, and term length to analyze the changing status of women
in Congress.

Whicker and Whitaker (1999) studied the decline in stereotypical

committee assignments for women and the impact of that change on women in Congress.
While concluding that women are marginalized and underrepresented in Congress, they
also concluded that a major factor in the success of a woman in Congress was being able
to cross over from stereotypical women’s issues such as health care, education and
poverty and into more masculine issues such as defense, economics and foreign policy.
The work therefore, agrees with Hawkesworth but augments it by providing examples
and methods of overcoming marginalization and stereotyping.
Scholars seemingly agree that women are initially outsiders facing sex-role
stereotyping and marginalization in Congress. Guy, (1995) who focused on Hillary
Clinton’s work on President Clinton’s health care plan is a case in point. The work of
Guy (1995) describes how Hillary R. Clinton, then the First Lady of the US, was not
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taken seriously when she initially approached Congress about health care. In her attempt
to work with Congress she subjected to the same sex-role stereotyping that women face
when arriving before Congress.
Other theories concerning women in Congress echo the more positive side of
Whicker and Whitaker’s (1999) theory. Arnold and King (2002), in their work on
women in committee, discuss how important committee placement is to power and
prestige in Congress. They differ from Hawkesworth (2003) in that they conclude that
marginalization and discrimination decrease as women gain legislative credibility and
power within Congress. Obtaining placement on the powerful, and traditionally male,
committees such as Foreign Affairs, Appropriations or Armed Services, requires time but
they suggest that over time women can shift from being outsider to insiders. They can
obtain the committee position needed to prove themselves in areas that are traditionally
male and show they have the toughness and savvy needed to command a majority in
Congress. Norton (1995) agrees that it committee placement and seniority can help the
transition from outsider to insider. Committees, according to Norton, are a vital and ideal
place for women to prove their effectiveness and represent the interests of women.
Taken together, these theories stress that women who run for office, and
particularly those who ascend, will share sociological and structural factors in common.
As such, once they arrive in Congress, all the women will face similar challenges of
stereotyping and marginalization. However, the theories presented also suggest that with
seniority and strong committee placement comes recognition and acceptance.
Demonstrating savvy, skill and toughness equal to the perceived levels of men, it is
possible to ascend in Congress.
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Research Methodology

Data
Data was collected from multiple sources, including autobiographies, biographies,
official government records, media reports and academic works.

Autobiographies

provide a wealth of information; however, they must be consulted with some degree of
skepticism.

Autobiographies are written to allow the author to convey his or her

perspective, which is valuable in the study of several variables, mainly gender. That
same perspective, however, can also skew the story being told in favor of the writer. For
example, Hillary Rodham Clinton has published an autobiography titled, Living History,
which can be used to provide great insight into her election and ascendancy in the Senate.
However, some skepticism must be used when reading the story since it is likely to be
biased in favor of making her look good.
Data will also come from mainstream print media and newsmagazines, featuring
personal interviews and headline stories derived from such sources as the New York
Times, Newsweek, Time, and The Washington Post. While Mainstream print media is
perhaps the most abundant and plentiful of all sources available as it provides
background information, it often does not provide the nuanced and in depth coverage
found in insider media and scholarly work. For more detailed coverage of the internal
affairs of Congress, scholarly work and insider media are the best resources. In addition
to mainstream print media sources, magazines, particularly ones that cater to women such
as O and Ms., can be useful since they often profile women in politics and government.
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When investigating the role of gender, the interviews, profiles, biographies and analysis
offered in these magazines will be important.
For more focused coverage of Congress, insider publications provide a great deal
of useful information. By insider publications I refer to publications such as The Hill,
Roll Call, and Congressional Quarterly that are largely read by members of Congress,
their staff, and few others. Insider publications are generally more attuned to the nuances
and internal activities of Congress. They include everything from in depth summaries of
committee activity to reports on the interpersonal dynamics occurring between members
of Congress.

For this reason, insider publications are an excellent source for

understanding how issues like committee effectiveness and gender affect leadership
ascendancy. While insider publications offer a great deal of detail, the source with the
greatest depth is still by far scholarly work from refereed journals. While scholarly work
that focuses on biographical data about one of my four subjects is hard to find, academic
literature contributes to theory building and quantitative analysis of variables that are
central to my work.
There are several sources used to measure committee placement, particularly with
respect to leadership ascendancy. Committee placement is a rather broad subject and
there are several subcategories to measure for a complete picture of the role of committee
placement and committee work on leadership ascendancy.

First, it is important to

measure the value of being on a certain committee with respect to leadership ascendancy.
Second, it is important to measure the effectiveness of a member in committee.
In the Senate, the committees are ranked within the rules, therefore providing a
reliable source of data on committee power and prestige. Data on committee power and
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prestige in the house is mostly found in qualitative work such accounts of members
Congress on the committee selection process and insider media. Of significant value is
the work by David Price, a political scientist who was elected to Congress. In his work
The Congressional Experience Price (2004) details at length the committee selection
process, giving valuable information on the most sought after and powerful committees
in the House of Representatives.
To measure the political savvy and effectiveness of a leader I will use the method
employed by Tate (2003), in her work Black Faces in the Mirror. I will compare the
number of bills the leaders I am studying have sponsored with the amount of bills passed
by collecting information from the “Thomas” legislative search engine provided by the
Congressional Research Service. The “Thomas” search engine is an online record of bills
that have been submitted and considered by Congress. It includes records of the final
disposition of bills and allows researchers to search bills by sponsor.
Ideology is the most easily quantifiable variable in this study. A variety of
organizations provide ideological scores for member of Congress, and it is those scores
that I will study to gain information about the ideology of members of Congress. Those
scores include the Pool-Rosenthal rating, a neutral rating system developed by political
scientists; the Committee on Political Education (COPE) rating, which is a rating system
developed by the AFL-CIO; the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) rating,
which is a left-leaning rating developed by civil rights activists; and the Conservative
Coalition rating, which is a conservative leaning rating established by the Conservative
Coalition. Using the ratings I will determine the mean and median ideological scores for
their fellow Democrats at the time of their ascension and perform a comparative analysis.
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The relative closeness of the leader’s ideological scores to the mean and median
ideological scores will provide evidence that will validate or eliminate the three theories
of leadership and ideology being considered in this work.
To measure the impact of fundraising on leadership ascendancy I will compare
the amount of money raised by those who ascended to the amounts raised by those who
did not. For measuring the importance of fundraising to Congressional ascendancy I will
use public records such as those kept by the Center for Responsive Politics and Federal
Election Commission (FEC) reports on fundraising. The Center for Responsive Politics
is a non-profit organization that tracks the fund-raising of politicians. The FEC, on the
other hand, is a governmental entity charged with monitoring elections and tracking fundraising on behalf of the government. All candidates must submit fund-raising reports to
the FEC, making the FEC a valuable primary source for information on fund-raising.
Additionally, there will also be information on this in mainstream and insider media.

Methodology
To develop and test hypotheses about Democratic leadership ascendancy in
Congress, I have adopted qualitative research methods that complement the comparative
case-study approach. These methods include historical analysis, textual analysis of
interview data, biographies and autobiographies. Those sources will identify the causal
conditions (or cross-case patterns) that provide important clues about the scope of
necessary (or sufficient) conditions for the phenomenon under empirical investigation in
this case, leadership ascendancy.
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One main objective of this comparative case-study is to identify patterns across
cases as I study each case independently. The cases have been purposely selected to
explain how specific independent variables—gender, committee placement, campaign
fundraising, ideology, bill passage success—influence leadership ascendancy in
Congress.

More specifically, the phenomenon of interest is Democratic leadership

ascendancy in both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate via the comparative
case-study method. This project starts with a relatively simple idea that the leadership
ascendancy of four salient political actors in the U.S. Congress parallel each other
sufficiently enough to permit comparing and contrasting them. I draw upon the concept
of leadership, both formal and informal, to investigate the ascendancy of Senator Hillary
R. Clinton, Senator Harry Reid, Representative Nancy Pelosi, and Representative Rosa
DeLauro. I maintain that the above cases are in fact alike enough to permit comparative
analysis as both Senator Harry Reid and Representative Nancy Pelosi are formal leaders,
and Senator Hillary Clinton and Representative Rosa Delauro are informal leaders—all
of whom are members of the Democratic Party.

In my mind, the search for

commonalities across these four cases should not prove too daunting.
The case study approach is most appropriate for the study of leadership
ascendancy in Congress for several reasons. First, the ascendancy of my subjects is well
documented and information about them is rich and plentiful. Second, the sample I am
studying is fairly small, causing the familiar “small n problem.” The “small n problem”
exists when the sample is too small to make generalizations. Therefore it is important to
use a method like a comparative case study to provide meaningful results and insight into
the matter being studied. Finally, there has been so much research and work done on

21

Congress and on leadership ascendancy that the norms and operating procedures of
Congress as an institution are already known and readily available for study. This
abundance of information enables qualitative comparative case-study research with a
high level of accuracy possible and well suited to the task.
My research is mostly qualitative, but it is important to mention the quantitative
methods used for some portions of the study.

Measuring political savvy and

effectiveness is, on its face, a difficult thing to measure but there are methods that can
measure the political skill and savvy of a member of Congress by their ability to get bills
and amendments they favor passed. Using “Thomas” to obtain the number of bills a
member has sponsored in committee, I can compare that to the number of bills sponsored
by that member that actually passed to obtain a rough measure of the member’s political
skill compared to their fellow committee and party members. Specifically I will measure
the ratio of bills that the leader being studied sponsored that actually passed for the four
years prior to the leader’s ascendancy. Comparing the ratio of the future leaders to the
ratio of their fellow Democratic members of the same committee an index will be
developed to measure the future leaders effectiveness compared to their colleagues. If a
member is achieving a higher percentage of bills they sponsor passed than their
colleagues, then we can conclude that in general they possess more legislative skills than
their colleagues.
Measuring committee placement, on the other hand, is more qualitative. In the
Senate committee rankings are written into the Senate Democrats’ rules. The research
will be simple in that it only involves ascertaining the rank of the committees to which
the Senate leaders were assigned. For the House of Representatives, the research is more
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complex since the committees are not ranked in the rules.

In the House of

Representatives committee seats are assigned by the party leadership and Steering
Committee. The best method for evaluating the power and prestige of a committee is by
researching insider media and locating other records that detail the selection process. The
committees in which seats are the most sought will be considered the most powerful and
prestigious committees.
As stated earlier, fundraising ability will be analyzed through the study of running
records of Congressional fundraising maintained by the Federal Elections Commission
(FEC) and the Center for Responsive Politics.

From those records I will be able to

compare the selected leaders in the case studies to their colleagues in Congress in terms
of fundraising. Additionally, research of insider publications will also yield information
on the Political Action Committees (PACs) operated by the leaders that would not be
readily obvious from FCC reports. The comparisons drawn from the fundraising seeks to
determine if there is a relationship between being a top fund raiser and being a leader in
Congress.
With respect to ideology there are several ideological scores, balanced across the
ideological spectrum, which I will use to generate a median score for each of the leader I
am studying as well as their colleagues. I will be testing the middleman, policy-deviant
and utility-maximizing as they apply to the ascendancy of the leaders in my case study.
My methodology will involve a comparison of the ideological scores of the leaders I have
selected to the median and mean of the rest of their party. The data yielded should
provide an idea of where the leader stands compared to the rest of their party and validate
or invalidate one or more of the three theories of ideology and leadership.
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Hypotheses

Committee Placement/Effectiveness
With respect to committee placement I hypothesize that those who have ascended
into the leadership will have held a post on one of the more powerful and prestigious
committees prior to their ascendancy. This is particularly true as the party leadership and
committee leadership become more closely coordinated. In order to ascend a leader must
establish a reputation and indebt other members of Congress to them, making
membership on a powerful committee extremely important to leadership ascendancy.
Part of establishing a reputation on a committee is demonstrating one’s political
skill and ability to use the legislative process in committee. For that reason there will be
a positive correlation between the legislative success index described in the methods
section and leadership ascendancy. That is to say that those who ascend in the leadership
are those that are better at getting bills passed than their Democratic colleagues on the
same committee in the same year.

Ideology
The House of Representatives and Senate operate in very different ways with
respect to certain procedures. The House of Representatives is a majoritarian body where
independence and compromise are not as heavily emphasized as the Senate. Therefore
the ideological model most closely followed in each body will differ.
In the House of Representatives the utility-maximizing model will dominate.
Research indicates that leadership ascendancy in the House of Representatives is heavily
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influenced by external political factors, such as satisfying the “base” and selecting leaders
that will aid a party in obtaining or holding majority status.

Therefore internal

ideological factors will not be as critical in the House as they are in the Senate. This is
not to say that internal ideological factors are irrelevant; ideological factors certainly play
a role in leadership ascendancy in the House of Representatives. The role played by
ideology is not a direct one though, and therefore, the policy-deviant model can be used
to explain aspects of leadership ascendancy in the House of Representatives.
In the Senate the middleman theory will dominate, though there will be some
influence from the policy-deviant model. The compromise and bi-partisan nature of the
Senate as well as the emphasis placed on independence, requires Senate leaders to reach
out to all members of their party and some members of the other party.

This is

particularly true when the threat of a filibuster exists; since 60 votes are needed to break a
filibuster and neither party currently has 60 votes in the Senate. Therefore, almost all the
ideological views will be accounted for in leader selection and the elected leader will be
on or near the median ideological score. I mention the possibility of some influence of
the policy deviant model because there have been several recent cases of senators such as
Sen. Jim Jeffords and Sen. Zell Miller, who voted mostly with the opposite party on
important issues and whose views were probably not often considered on internal party
decisions and leader selections.

Fund Raising Ability
I hypothesize that there will be a positive correlation between fund-raising and
leadership ascendancy. In practical terms this means that the members of Congress who
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ascend into the leadership will be among the top fund-raisers in Congress. As the role of
chief fundraiser becomes a larger aspect of the job description for a Congressional leader
it naturally follows that fund-raising ability will be a factor when electing leaders.

Gender
As a starting point, I accept Hawkesworth’s (2003) notion that Congress is in
many ways, a gendered institution.

Stereotyping and marginalization are certainly

barriers to women in Congress. I hypothesize that there are socialization and structural
factors that inhibit women’s success in Congress. Hillary Clinton’s experience with
health care demonstrates the challenges that women face when originally confronting
Congress. Though Clinton was not a member of Congress at the time she faced many of
the same challenges women face when first joining Congress as a member. Therefore,
women will arrive in Congress essentially as outsiders, making it especially difficult for
them to “get their foot in the door” and ascend to the leadership.
Scholars such as Arnold and King (2002), and Whicker and Whitaker (1999)
though, stress the importance of committee placement for women.

Both stress the

importance of committee placement on powerful and traditionally male committees to
women as a method of gaining credibility and establishing their status as insiders.
Traditionally male policy areas include defense, economics and foreign affairs while
traditionally feminine policy areas include children’s issues, welfare and poverty (Kahn,
1996). In line with their arguments, I believe it is possible for women to move beyond
outsider status after proving their toughness and savvy. I hypothesize therefore that
women will ascend after they have established legislative credibility, particularly in
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traditionally male policy areas. To obtain legislative credibility it will be important to
have membership on a powerful, traditionally male committee, and do prominent
legislative work on traditionally male issues. Once they have become insiders the effect
of gender is not necessarily positive or negative. The utility-maximizing model, for
example, might dictate that a woman will be chosen to ascend to attract the constituency
of women to the Democratic Party.
In summary, therefore, the effect of gender for the leadership ascendancy of
women initially entering Congress will be to inhibit ascent into the leadership. However,
good performance on committee, or some other exemplary action, could move the
women from being outsider to insiders. Once they become insiders, though, the effect of
gender will be inconsistent and vary based on the individual and the situation.
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“It was really quite profound. I realized the opportunity that I had, and it was
poignant because it made me think, Why did it take this long? It sounds strange, but as I
sat down, I felt that I was not alone. For an instant, I felt as though Susan B. Anthony,
Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton—everyone who'd fought for women's right to vote
and for the empowerment of women in politics, in their professions, and in their lives—
were there with me in the room.”
– Rep. Nancy Pelosi (2004)

Nancy Pelosi

Nancy Patricia Pelosi has been called many things in her career; among them
“airhead,” tough, compassionate and a natural vote counter. While she may or may not
be easily reduced to the previous traits, it is sure that she is a unique Congresswoman
who blends dedication to ideals with a back-scratching political style learned from her
father.

Despite her loss in 1985 in the race for Chair of the Democratic National

Committee, Pelosi’s fortune changed when she received a deathbed endorsement from
San Francisco Congresswoman Sala Burton. Pelosi’s campaign in the special election
that resulted from the death of Sala Burton was a display of what she had learned from
her father. She built a campaign and a coalition from the ground up, reaching across
ideological and party lines (Barabak, 2003). Nancy Pelosi then came to Congress with a
reputation as being a politically savvy and strong woman, an excellent fundraiser, and a
liberal – though she would later refer to herself as a “non-menacing progressive”
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(Barabak, 2003).

How those factors combined and influenced her rise to House

Democratic Leader is the subject of the next several sections.

Committee/Legislative Performance
For Nancy Pelosi to ascend into the leadership of her party she would need to
prove that was able to work both the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the more
centrist elements of her party. She would also need to prove her ability to master a
variety of policy areas, particularly those traditionally dominated by men. In order to
demonstrate her political skills and ability to master diverse policy areas Pelosi would
need placement on prestigious committees and must be able to greatly influence
legislation and policy that comes out of that committee.
As the ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee subcommittee on
Foreign Operations Appropriations as well as the longest serving member of the
Intelligence Committee in the history of Congress, Pelosi was able to demonstrate her
political savvy and command of the issues. Despite being from the left wing of her party
both her fellow Democrats and Republican colleagues have noted her ability to reach
across the ideological spectrum in committee and as leader. As former Intelligence
Committee Chairman Porter Goss said “Does she have the ability to go beyond
representing the left wing of her party? The answer is clearly yes” (2003).
Data collected on the passage of bills from Democrats on the Appropriations
Committee in the last four years that Pelosi was on the committee demonstrate that as
compared to her colleagues, she is able to get more bills that she sponsors passed. Over
the course of those four years 21% of the bills and amendments she sponsored passed,
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ranking her 4th out of 31 Democrats that served on the Appropriations committee during
those four years. The high ranking confirms the anecdotal evidence presented by media
sources and fellow members of Congress about Pelosi’s political skill.
Serving on prestigious committees normally dominated by men also played a
large role in her ascendance.

As the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Operations

Appropriations Subcommittee she was able to exercise influence on a variety of foreign
policy issues. Additionally she was the longest serving member of House Intelligence
Committee in the history of Congress. Originally insulted as a “liberal dilettante” and
“airhead” when she first ran for Congress (Barabak, 2003), she was able to gain the
credibility needed to be leader by working on important issues of foreign policy and
national security. This work was also critical for overcoming gender stereotypes she
encountered, but I will discuss that in further detail in the section on gender.
Within her committee there are three examples of how she approached issues and
legislative work that I wish to discuss as illustrations of her political savvy and ability to
work within the legislative process. First, the controversy over China, trade, and human
rights violations; second, her work on international family planning and abortion funding;
and third, her work on pushing for an independent 9/11 commission.
Pelosi, has been a consistent advocate of conditioning trade agreements with
China on improvements in their human rights record, and since 1993 has opposed several
trade bills involving China (Pomfret and Slevin, 2002; Cranford, 1993). This case is
noteworthy because it demonstrates how Pelosi reached across ideological lines to create
a united opposition to increased trade with China. In her coalition against a 2000 trade
bill was Barney Frank, the liberal and openly gay Congressman from Massachusetts, and
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Chris Smith the staunch abortion opponent from New Jersey (Schmitt, 2000).

The

passage or failure of the numerous bills concerning China that came through Congress
during Pelosi’s career is not as important as the coalition she was able to create with
ideologically diverse members of Congress. The way she was able to create and sustain a
coalition would be a foreshadowing for her race for Minority Whip and then Minority
Leader. During those contests she would be accused of being too liberal but would be
backed by colleagues nonetheless who often mentioned her ability to work with diverse
colleagues in issues such as trade with China. Her work on the issue of China in
committee and on the floor was essential to her ascendancy because it laid the
groundwork for her reputation for working well with the various elements of her party.
As ranking Democrat on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee,
Pelosi had the difficult task of defending abortion funding for international family
planning organizations.

While controversy over funding for international family

planning organizations is an annual event in Congress, the issue became even more
contentious when Rep. Chris Smith of NJ proposed an amendment to the 1998 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Bill that prohibited funding any organization that performed
abortions (Cassata, 1997). The Senate bill did not contain similar language and President
Clinton threatened a veto if the bill came to him with the Smith amendment – stalemate
appeared inevitable (Cassata, 1997). Again demonstrating legislative flexibility, Pelosi
teamed up with Republican Benjamin Gillman to offer a compromise amendment. The
amendment would have allowed organizations that performed abortions to receive funds
as long as they did not actively promote abortion as a method of family planning
(Doherty, 1997).
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The bipartisan Pelosi-Gillman amendment was rejected 218-210, though it cannot
be considered a total failure. Rep. Sonny Callahan (R-AL) said “We have to come up
with compromise legislation. I don’t know which direction we’ll take. The Pelosi
amendment came awfully close” (1997). Pelosi’s compromise amendment was a part of
a pattern of working with diverse colleagues and assuring those that doubted her ability to
work with a moderate Democratic caucus. This case is particularly relevant because
abortion rights have always been a cause she could be counted on to champion. Her
ability to compromise on an issue that was a mainstay of hers’ and her liberal base in San
Francisco is an important indicator of her legislative style. It is emblematic of how she
reached across to the various elements of her party to win her race for Democratic Whip
and Democratic Leader.
While the last two examples of her work on the floor and in committee were
examples of Pelosi’s ability to build diverse coalitions, it is worth discussing a third case
demonstrating her work on traditionally male issues. In 2002, Pelosi working with
colleagues on the House Intelligence Committee pushed for the creation of an
independent 9/11 commission to investigate the attacks of 9/11 (Milbank and Priest,
2002). Pelosi, and other several other Representatives and Senators were upset by what
they perceived to be President Bush’s opposition to the creation of the 9/11 commission.
The ensuing struggle featured Pelosi often in the spotlight discussing issues of terrorism
and national security. Pelosi worked with Senators Lieberman (D-CT) and McCain (RAZ) to decry the opposition to the 9/11 commissions, which originated from what she
called the “invisible hand” of the White House (Dewar, 2002).
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In September 2002, the administration conceded and agreed to the formation of
the 9/11 commission (Milbank and Priest, 2002).

The concession though must be

attributed to the work of the Democrats and Republicans who worked together to
pressure the President to create the commission – Pelosi among them. Her ability to
credibly apply pressure on matters of intelligence stems from her longtime service on the
House Intelligence Committee Milbank and Priest, 2002). Her service on the House
Intelligence Committee thus gave her the gravitas and credibility not only to pressure the
President on the creation of an independent 9/11 commission but also to shake off gender
stereotypes and proves she has the credibility needed to lead the Democratic party in
Congress.
Placement on a prestigious committee and demonstrated legislative skill within
committee provide the credibility and demonstrated skill that is especially important for
women’s ascendancy in Congress. Before running for Congress Pelosi was a fundraiser
and leader of the California State Democratic Party, but had no experience as an elected
legislator. She needed to demonstrate her ability to work outside the liberal base that she
came from as well as prove that she could expand beyond policy areas traditionally
associated with women. Her experience with trade issue with China and international
family planning were essential to establishing the fact that she could, and often did,
expand out of her liberal base to work with other members. A constant concern of
colleagues and point of criticism for leadership rivals was her inability to keep the party
united and in the mainstream. Her work in committee and on the floor proved that she
could, in fact keep the party united.
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Her work with China and also on the 9/11 commission also established her
competence in all policy areas, particularly male dominated areas. For a woman to
ascend into a leadership position she must demonstrate her ability to expand beyond just
women’s issue, and Pelosi did that. The prestige of Pelosi’s committee assignments and
the legislative skill she demonstrated were essential for her future ascendancy to
Democratic Leader.

Ideology
A constant theme in Nancy Pelosi’s ascendancy is the concern that she is “too
liberal.” Those who have competed against her for leadership positions such as Martin
Frost, Harold Ford, and Steny Hoyer have all attacked her by claiming she could not
unite a diverse party and represent mainstream America. Despite the attacks, Pelosi has
been able to ascend, and it is important to attempt to interpret her ascendancy through
theories of ideology and leadership.
Averaging the ideological rankings from the Leadership Council on Civil Rights,
AFL-CIO, American Conservative Union, and the Poole-Rosenthal system Pelosi is on
average the 32nd most liberal Democratic member of Congress out of 204. The median
voter theory would dictate that the leader chosen be close to the median ideological
position. Her extreme distance from the median position invalidates the median voter
theory as a plausible explanation for the ideological factors in her ascendancy. The
policy deviant model modifies the median voter theory by suggesting the members of the
constituency out of the mainstream are not included in the calculation of the median.
However, the policy deviant model cannot apply here because not only will removing the
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most conservative Democrats not move her much closer to the median, but she is among
the most liberal Democrats that would likely be removed when applying the policy
deviant model.
The only model remaining therefore is the utility maximizing model. The utility
maximizing model states that there can be incentives to select a leader that overpower the
tendency for a group to pick a leader with a median ideology. Simply being the only
model left, though, does not make it correct. However, there is substantial evidence that
the utility maximizing model is the most appropriate for which to interpret Pelosi’s
ascendancy. As the San Francisco Gate reported, supporters generally focused on two
areas in which Pelosi offered a real advantage to the Democrats; attracting women to the
party and raising money (Fram, 2001).
Rep. George Miller (D-CA), who ran Pelosi’s campaign for Democratic Whip
Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) both mentioned the importance of having a woman in the
leadership of the party would have for attracting women to the party.

Clearly Miller,

Frank, and others who felt like them, believed there was an advantage to picking Pelosi in
that the party will be more attractive to women (Fram, 2001). The other advantage is her
fundraising ability. San Francisco and New York City are the top two fundraising bases
for the Democratic Party and Pelosi makes full use of San Francisco’s resources. Just for
the 2000 election cycle she raised $3 million, though Democrats are more hesitant to
boast about that element of the advantage Pelosi could provide (Foerstel, A, 2001).
The twin advantages recognized by members of Congress and those who cover
them reveal that there was utility to be gained by selecting Pelosi as Democratic Whip
and then as Democratic Leader even though there were candidates for both positions who
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were far closer to the median Democratic ideology. That points overwhelmingly to the
applicability of the utility maximizing theory as the best explanation for the ideological
factors in Nancy Pelosi’s ascendancy. Needless to say then, the median voter theory and
middleman theory are inadequate in explaining Pelosi’s ascendancy.

Fundraising
Fundraising is a well known strength of Pelosi’s and as the literature suggests,
played an important role in her ascendancy to Democratic Whip and then Democratic
Leader. Part of her ability to raise significant amounts of money comes from the fact that
San Francisco, along with New York is among the richest source of money for
Democrats and that her seat is very safe since she has not yet won a general election with
less than 75% of the vote (Foerstel, A, 2001).
By most standards, the money Pelosi raised for her own campaigns is respectable
but fairly modest.

Compared to the sums raised by her colleagues for their own

campaigns in 2000, 2002 and 2004 she averaged being the 101st best fundraiser in the
House out of 204 members. As insider publications astutely point out though, her safe
seat allows her to raise modest sums for her own campaigns and contribute vast sums of
money to other candidates through Political Action Committees she creates. In 2000
Pelosi contributed $1.3 million to fellow Democratic candidates and in 2002 traveled
across the country to raise over $30 million for fellow candidates and the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (Allen, 2004). She does not always wait for other
members of Congress to approach her, she has been known to offer assistance unsolicited
– something which has undoubtedly helped her build her base of support in Congress. By
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raising significant sums of money for other candidates Pelosi has been able to prove that
by selecting her as a leader the party will gain a substantial advantage in fundraising.
This advantage then seems to point to a clear link between fundraising abilities and
leadership ascendancy.

Gender
Scholars agree that women, when they first approach Congress, are outsiders and
subject to a certain level of stereotyping and discrimination (Hawkesworth, 2003;
Whicker and Whitaker 1999; Guy, 1995). Whicker and Whitaker though have found
empirical evidence of the ability of women to cross over from outsiders to insiders
through committee work on traditionally masculine issues.

That story, which is

essentially my hypothesis, is an accurate representation of the career of Nancy Pelosi.
Initially regarded as an airhead and traditional female liberal she was able to cross over
into traditionally masculine issues of foreign policy and national security to establish
credibility and become an insider.
The ability of women in the House Democrats to break into the leadership has
always been difficult. In 1998 when Rosa DeLauro was defeated in the race for Chair of
the Democratic Caucus, one fifth of all Democratic Representatives in Congress were
women. Despite holding over one fifth of the seats in the Democratic Caucus, women
were unrepresented in the Democratic leadership in Congress (Khachigan, 1998).
Campaigning for the House, Pelosi was insulted as being soft and unintelligent – insults
many perceive to have sexist connotations since it exploits a stereotype of a homely
woman unable to compete with “the boys” on complex issues (Barabak, 2003). It is
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almost impossible to consider a male opponent being insulted in the same way as Pelosi.
Critics of her leadership style referred to her as “motherly,” “gushing” and implied that
she was immature and somehow more fragile than the men in Congress.

Pelosi

acknowledged the difficulty she faced when she said “This is difficult turf to win on for
anyone, but for a woman breaking ground here it was a tough battle” (2001).
To be fair, the discrimination she faced was not as debilitating as some
stereotyping and discrimination that has occurred in Congress against women in the
recent past. She was given opportunities to become an insider and prove her abilities
equal to men. Those opportunities largely came through her fundraising prowess and as
Whicker and Whitaker (1999) predicted, her work in committee.
Central to Pelosi’s becoming an insider was working and proving her proficiency
in traditionally male issues such as international relations and national security. While
Pelosi did champion traditional women’s concerns such as abortion rights, poverty and
human rights she often did so in the context of and alongside her work on national
security and international relations.

For example, on the Foreign Operations

Appropriations Subcommittee she took on prominent issues in international relations,
most notably US policy towards China. While her focus on China was largely focused on
trade and defense, she also worked on international issues that would be considered more
traditionally feminine such as human rights, 3rd world debt relief and international family
planning. In her work on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, Pelosi
proved her abilities to take on issues of international relations and national security while
at the same time pursuing traditional feminist concerns, such as international family
planning and abortion rights.
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Her expertise on national security issues was firmly established by her record long
service on the House Intelligence Committee.

Serving on the House Intelligence

Committee allowed her to be at the forefront of the push to create the 9/11 commission
and in a true sign of her insider status, delivered the foreign policy rebuttal to President
Bush’s 2005 State of the Union Address.
Her work on issues of international relations and national security helped bring
her to insider status and make her election as leader possible. While gender was always
an issue for her, once she had transitioned to insider status, gender took a more
ambiguous role. Following her movement to insider status gender was discouraging
some from supporting her and giving others an incentive to support her. Legislators such
as George Miller (D-CA) and Barney Frank (D-MA) explicitly mention gender as a
reason for support, believing that as a moral and electoral issue a woman should be
chosen as a leader. While Miller and Frank represent Democrats whose support was
related to gender, the effect of stereotypes and marginalization did not disappear and
played an inhibitory role. In the case of Pelosi, the positive effects of gender outweighed
the inhibitory effects and allowed her to ascend to Democratic Leader. Overall, her
experience confirms the hypothesis that following conversion to insider status the role of
gender is ambiguous and unclear in its level of acceleration or inhibition of ascendance.
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“I worry about marginalizing women in the institution [Congress]…It’s a very
competitive place, and what you need to do is build coalitions, and since there are 29
women who don’t think alike, you build coalitions among women and you build coalitions
among men. If you sit there and say, ‘I’m a woman, we’re in the minority here,’ then
you’re never going to get anywhere in this body.”
– Rep. Rosa DeLauro, 1992

Rosa DeLauro

Throughout her entire life, Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) has shown an energy and
determination to ascend that it unmistakable. In her position within the National Urban
Fellows Program and Mayor of New Haven’s office DeLauro was able to demonstrate
her political skill and energy, something that caught the eye of Representative and Senate
Candidate Christopher J. Dodd. Dodd recruited DeLauro to be his campaign manager for
his 1980 campaign, which he won. Following Dodd’s victory DeLauro came with him to
Washington to be his Chief of Staff for seven years. Her time as Chief of Staff for Sen.
Dodd would give her an inside perspective and lay the groundwork for the connections
and credibility on which she would capitalize as a member of Congress.
Following her time in Washington with Senator Dodd, DeLauro worked as the
Executive Director of Countdown ’87, which was a program to end US support for
Nicaraguan contras. In addition to Countdown ’87 she ran EMILY’s (Early Money Is
Like Yeast – it helps the dough rise) List, an organization that raised money for female,
pro-choice candidates. Like her time in Washington, her work on Countdown ’87 and
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EMILY’s List laid the foundation for her work in Congress and fundraising. When
DeLauro ran for Congress in 1990, the fundraising help she received from EMILY’s list
would prove invaluable.
In 1990, Representative Bruce Morrison left his seat in the House to run for
Governor, and DeLauro ran for his seat. Raising significant amounts of money early, she
was able to easily ward off opponents in the primary but faced a serious challenge in the
general election. Even though she was in a Democratic district, her opponent portrayed
her as a radical liberal, making the race close. However, DeLauro was able to draw on
the local political roots she had in the New Haven and create a coalition of liberals,
organized labor and traditional Democrats to win by four points. That would be the last
serious challenge for election that she would face.

Committee/Legislative Performance
Committee assignment and performance has both helped and hurt DeLauro in her
ascendancy to the leadership. She has been able to prove her legislative and political skill
but has not crossed over into traditionally male areas of policy as much as Pelosi.
However, her prestigious committee assignments and demonstrated effectiveness has
certainly allowed her to transition into insider status and ascend into positions as both an
official and unofficial leader Democrats in Congress.
Scholars, such as Arnold and King (2002), point out how important the
assignment to powerful and prestigious committees is, especially for women. DeLauro
was able to avail herself of the advantages of sitting on a powerful committee by
obtaining a seat on the House Appropriations Committee. Compared to her Democratic
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colleagues on the Appropriations Committee though, she does not pass many of the bills
she sponsors. Of the 30 Democrats that served with her in the 108th and 107th Congress
on the Appropriations Committee she is ranked 26th in terms of bills she sponsored that
passed the House. That statistic is somewhat misleading though since DeLauro has
proposed far more bills, and far more substantial bills than her colleagues. In terms of the
number of bills proposed, DeLauro is ranked second of 30 Democrats in her committee.
Furthermore, when compared to her colleagues, a higher percentage of bills proposed by
DeLauro were of the substantial nature, as opposed to purely symbolic bills. Many
Democratic members of her committee had higher pass rates because of easily passing
symbolic proposals, such as those to name Post Offices. DeLauro, however, was
proposing a continuous stream of substantial legislation concerning issues such as the
child tax credit, which made it more difficult for her to obtain the high pass rate enjoyed
by her Democratic colleagues on the House Appropriations Commitee.
The above statistics attest to DeLauro’s legislative activity. Often times she is the
one out in front vigorously pressing for policies and legislation as an unofficial leader, as
she did with legislation on gun control and abortion. Since that energy and leadership is
a critical element of her legislative and committee performance, it is worth examining
three examples of her most prominent legislative work: gun control, labor outsourcing,
and abortion.
Since her arrival in Congress Rep. DeLauro has been active in urging the passage
of more stringent gun control laws. As early as 1993, three years after her election, she
was proposing legislation on gun control. The Hartford Courant identified her as one of
the leading supporters of increased gun control in Congress (Gottlieb, 1993). Her
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political skill and leadership on the issue, however, was most prominent in the passage of
gun control legislation in 1999. Working with fellow Congressional women, Rep. Nita
Lowey and Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY), DeLauro led the charge to adopt the most
stringent gun control proposal in 1999 (Bruni, A, 1999). Of all the house Democrats
supporting stricter gun control, they were out in front in terms of publicity and intramural
lobbying. DeLauro led the fight to have stricter gun control amendments attached to an
Appropriations bill, which was prohibited by the powerful Rules Committee (Bruni, B,
1999).
When asked for their motivations, the triad of gun controllers consistently
mentioned children and the effects of gun violence on children. So much was the battle
for gun control becoming linked to children that the New York Times and CQ Weekly
both reported that gun control was increasingly an issue linked to the choices of female
voters. For that reason many men were becoming reluctant to take up gun control as a
prominent issue (Bruni, A, 1999; Kirchkoff, 1999). For Rosa DeLauro, the battle over
gun control was an important one where she gained credibility and reputation as a
legislator. Her work on gun control, increasingly regarded as a feminine issue, however,
did little help DeLauro make the transition to insider status. To transition she would need
to take on more traditionally male issues, something I will discuss in further detail in the
section on the effects of gender in DeLauro’s career.
While DeLauro’s efforts on gun control were promoted by fellow Democrats as
appealing to women voters, her work on outsourcing and policy towards expatriate
corporations allowed her to expand her leadership into areas dominated by men. In 2003
and 2004 DeLauro pushed for a cap on visas that allowed foreign workers to be brought

43

into the US. She also proposed legislation to prohibit the federal government from doing
business with companies that leave the US to take advantage of tax havens (Martin, 2003;
Wolfe, 2004). Once again, she was out in front as a leader in the movement to restrict
outsourcing.
Her presence as a leader on the floor and in the press room allowed DeLauro to
appeal to more than just women. She was able to appeal to everyone concerned with
outsourcing, from organized labor to non-Democrats who were concerned about the issue
(Martin, 2003). DeLauro’s leadership on economic issues were thus vital in allowing her
to better transcend gender obstacles within the House and move closer to becoming an
insider. Her ability to take a leadership role in the legislative process and lead in a
movement that appealed to a broad range of constituents allowed her to further transition
to insider status within the Congressional Democratic Caucus.
The third example of Rep. DeLauro’s legislative leadership involves her work on
abortion rights, specifically the controversy of abortion rights within the military. As one
of his first acts as President, President Clinton reversed a ban on abortions on overseas
military bases for military personnel, permitting them as long as the service member paid
for them herself (Cassata, 1995). Rep. Dornan (R-CA) then went head to head with Rep.
DeLauro when he proposed an amendment to the 1996 Department of Defense
Authorization Bill, to override Clinton’s executive order and DeLauro offered a substitute
amendment that would codify President Clinton’s executive order into law (Cassata,
1995).
Rep. Dornan’s amendment won passage by a vote of 226-191 while DeLauro’s
amendment failed by a vote of 194-224 (Cassata, 1995). DeLauro’s amendment failed
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but this outcome was not surprising. In 1995, when the vote took place, the House of
Representatives was majority pro-life, which made it difficult to pass any bill in support
of abortion in the House (Palmer, 1995). However, one cannot help but notice that the
vote on DeLauro’s amendment was closer than the vote on Dornan’s, albeit by only five
votes. But what we can learn from closeness of the vote on the DeLauro amendment
compared to the Dornan amendment is that DeLauro was able to compete and
demonstrate leadership and political savvy in her ability to keep a coalition together. The
evidence of her ability to hold coalitions together is further demonstrated by her previous
work as Chief Deputy Whip within the Democratic Caucus. Like her work on gun
control, however, DeLauro’s work on abortion is perceived by many to be a women’s
issue that offered limited abilities to cross over and gain insider status among her male
colleagues in Congress. Additionally, her ability to hold a coalition together in the face
of adversity was certainly important in demonstrating she had the legislative and political
skills to ascend into the leadership.
As Congressional scholars have pointed out, placement on a powerful committee
and demonstrated political savvy are essential to ascending into Congressional leadership
positions. Assignment to the prestigious Appropriations Committee gave her the
opportunity to demonstrate her skill and with her energetic leadership in committee and
on the floor in the areas of gun control, outsourcing, and abortion she successfully proved
that she had the skill and savvy needed to be a Congressional leader.

Ideology

45

To assess the affect of ideology on the ascendance of Rosa DeLauro the three
theories of ascendance will be applied to determine which one is the most accurate
descriptor of DeLauro’s ascendance. For Pelosi, the utility maximizing theory was the
most accurate descriptor, and it is the same for Rep. DeLauro for similar reasons. Before
I can positively assert that the utility maximizing theory is the most accurate it is
necessary to demonstrate that the middleman theory and the policy deviant model are not
accurate descriptors of the impact of ideology on her ascendance.
Averaging the rankings of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR),
the AFL-CIO, the American Conservative Union (ACU) and the Poole-Rosenthal
rankings, Rep. DeLauro is the 22.75th (out of 205) most liberal member of Congress
among Democrats in the 107th and 108th Congress. This clearly eliminates the
middleman theory as a plausible explanation. For the middleman theory to be accurate
DeLauro would have to occupy the ideological median, which in her case would be
approximately the 102nd most liberal member of Congress. Being approximately 80
positions of the median, we can be sure that the middleman theory is not applicable.
Testing the policy deviant model, we can also see that it is not accurate in this
case. Like Pelosi, DeLauro’s perfect score from the LCCR and 96 out of 100 score from
the AFL-CIO, 5 out 100 score from the ACU, and liberal rating from the Poole-Rosenthal
system suggest that if the policy deviant model was to be applied she would move farther
from the median. When the people who are more liberal than DeLauro were removed
from the data set, as part of applying the policy deviant model, DeLauro moved farther
from the median and closer to being among the most liberal Democratic members of
Congress. As she moves closer to the top, she moves farther from the median, thus
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eliminating the policy deviant model as an adequate explanation for the effect of ideology
on her ascent.
Given the implausibility of the middleman theory and the policy deviant model it
is now important to show that the utility maximizing model accurately describes the
ideological issues in the ascendance of Rep. DeLauro. Like Rep. Pelosi, electing Rep.
DeLauro into the leadership was perceived by other members of Congress as a move that
could attract more women and money to the party. The influence of gender and the
utility maximizing model on DeLauro’s ascendancy is clear. Following her 108-97 vote
loss to Martin Frost in a race for Chair of the House Democratic Caucus, women were
completely excluded from the leadership, prompting Rep. Diane DeGette (D-CO) to say
“We’re mad as hell, we’re now almost 60 women [in the House] and its important to
have a voice in the leadership” (2003). The pressure from women within the party led
Democratic Leader Dick Gephardt to create new positions, including Assistant to the
Democratic Leader and Vice-Chair of the House Democratic Caucus (Foerstel, 1998).
He encouraged DeLauro to run for Assistant to the Democratic Leader and endorsed her
candidacy, which allowed her an easy win. In this case, DeLauro’s advancement to
Assistant to the Democratic Leader was linked to her gender. Gephardt, for a variety of
reasons, decided the party would be advantaged if it included women among its
leadership. In this sense, DeLauro provided a utilitarian advantage for the party.
In 2002 DeLauro again ran for Caucus Chair stressing the utilitarian advantages
of her ascendancy to the leadership. She used her experience running EMILY’s list to
raise over $1 million for other House candidates and often mentioned how she had
organized Democratic “rapid response teams” and had markedly improved Democratic

47

Party communications (Lightman, 2002). Running against Robert Menendez (D-NJ),
who was attempting to become the first Hispanic in the Democratic leadership, her
utilitarian advantage was reduced. DeLauro’s other advantage, fundraising, was
eliminated because Menendez had also raised significant sums of money (Hernandez,
2001). Furthermore, the election of Pelosi as leader reduced the feeling that a woman
must be elected into the leadership. In the end, DeLauro lost by one vote. Following her
loss to Menendez, DeLauro was appointed Co-Chair of the Democratic Steering
Committee, which has great influence over Democratic Committee Assignments in the
House (Townsend, 2002).
Throughout DeLauro’s career, utilitarian advantages in energy, gender, and
fundraising have played a crucial role her in ascendancy. Her advantage in being able to
attract women to the party came from two sources: her being a woman and her being a
leader in the traditionally feminine issues of gun control and abortion. Her advantages in
fundraising came from her experience running EMILY’s List and ability to raise large
sums of money for the party. However, the fact that her utilitarian advantages were not
as strong as others such as Pelosi and Menendez made it more difficult for her to
overcome her being more liberal than most of the Democratic Caucus and ascend into the
leadership of the Congressional Democrats.

Fundraising
Utilizing her experience running EMILY’s List and as Sen. Dodd’s Chief of Staff,
DeLauro has always been a top fundraiser among Democrats. It follows, therefore, that
her fundraising prowess is often mentioned as an advantage she possesses in most
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leadership contests. Like Pelosi, DeLauro’s district is majority Democratic and she has
not faced a close campaign since her initial campaign for Congress. As such, the amount
of money she raises and spends on her own campaigns is not extraordinary. In 2004, for
example, she raised $725, 470 for her own campaign, which was lower than the median
of $809,715 for House Democrats in the 108th Congress. Since her reelection is
relatively assured, she is able to raise significant sums of money for fellow Democrats,
the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and EMILY’s List. In the 1998
and 2000 election cycles DeLauro raised over $1 million for fellow House candidates to
support their campaigns (Foerstel, 2002). The link between fundraising and leadership
ascendancy is clear here. Rep. Gephardt’s spokeswoman Laura Nichols, stated the
connection well when she said “It’s one of the considerations people make when they
vote for leaders, members ask, what have they done for the party?” (1996). By raising
significant sums of money for the Congressional Democrats, DeLauro showed exactly
what she could “do for the party.”

Gender
Like most women in Congress, be they widows who occupied a seat vacated by a
deceased spouse or seasoned career politicians like Pelosi and DeLauro who were elected
in their own right, DeLauro faced initial challenges when entering Congress. However,
she was able to transcend the barriers to women in Congress and ascend into the
leadership by crossing over to insider status within the House. To cross over to insider
status she demonstrated legislative and fundraising skills. Nonetheless, her ascendancy,
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however, has been difficult because she has not focused on traditionally male issues as
much as other women who have ascended, such as Pelosi.
Despite having local connections and having raised over a million dollars for her
campaign, DeLauro won her first race by only four percentage points. The race is
significant because, as the Washington Post reported, it had a gendered quality. In a
heated exchange over abortion on a radio debate, DeLauro’s opponent said to DeLauro
“Why don’t you calm down?” and “Put a sock in it for a minute” (Finkel, 1992). Her
opponent later on remarked that gender might have played a role in how he reacted to
DeLauro, and the attitude is symbolic of the condescending and dismissive attitude
women often face in Congress. Reacting to the debate, DeLauro’s husband, who also
happened to be President Clinton’s pollster, recommended that she focus the campaign
on the single issue of abortion, since the polls showed it would be highly effective in
gaining support. DeLauro refused, insisting that she did not want to be caught in the
stereotypical trap of just being a pro-choice woman candidate (Finkel, 1992).
Throughout her Congressional career, DeLauro would be affected by the
stereotype of the weak, emotional, liberal that her opponent portrayed her as. Over the
course of her time in Congress, however, she has been able to overcome the force of most
of those stereotypes. Through her energy and skill in legislating, even though her most
prominent issues tend to be traditionally female, she has been able to debunk the
stereotypes and prove she cand be tough, savvy, and effective legislator. Unlike the
online biography on Pelosi’s website which discusses the Intelligence Committee and
national security as being among her primary concerns, DeLauro’s website focuses on
education, children’s issues, gun control and abortion, all of which constitute traditionally
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feminine issues that have inhibited her ascendancy. For example, other Democratic
members of Congress that voted for her opponent in the Caucus Chair race, Martin Frost,
cited that he was perceived as being more moderate and able to represent of a broader
range of members and issues (Foerstel, 1998). Even her advantage in fundraising was
tilted more to women’s issues since she gained a lot of her experience in fundraising
while raising money for pro-choice women candidates for EMILY’s List. DeLauro,
though facing difficulty was still able to ascend as an unofficial leader due to her
strengths. Before her first caucus race, she had established a reputation as a Chief
Deputy Whip and fundraiser. Her colleagues knew she was a talented legislator, and the
insider credibility she had gained allowed gender to turn around and work in her favor in
the race for Assistant to the Democratic Leader. While, her work as Assistant to the
Democratic Leader gave her more credibility as a leader, her main issues were still
traditionally female and she once again lost the race for Caucus Chair in 2002. Despite
that loss she continued to ascend to be Co-Chair of the Democratic Steering Committee
(Townsend, 2002).
As my hypothesis predicted, gender initially inhibited the ascendancy of DeLauro.
Until she could cross over from outsider to status to insider status she would be plagued
by the stereotypes and other symptoms of gendered institutions that Hawkesworth (2003)
points out in her work. By demonstrating her legislative skill as a leader, in committee
and on the floor, she was able to make the transition to insider status. Her ascendancy
has still been difficult because she has not been able to fully transition to insider status
since most of her most prominent work is on women’s issues. Her continued focus on
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women’s issues continues to exacerbate the negative effects of feminine stereotypes and
inhibit her ability to ascend.
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“We were living in an era in which some people still felt deeply ambivalent about women
in positions of public leadership and power. In this era of changing gender roles, I was
America’s Exhibit A.”
– Sen. Hillary Clinton, 2003

Hillary Clinton

In 1992 William J. Clinton was elected President, placing Hillary Clinton in the
role of First Lady. As First Lady she chose not to stand by silently and instead took an
active policy role. Most prominently, she chaired the National Task Force on Health
Care Reform, and it was there that she faced Congress and the full force of gender issues
in politics. Though I will discuss it in further detail later on, Clinton’s near calamitous
experience with health care both demonstrated the gendered nature of Congress as well as
paved the way for Ms. Clinton to be credible as a lawmaker and leader when she would
run for the Senate on her own.
In 1999 Clinton decided to run for Senate, and that is where the in depth case
study begins. Clinton became the first First Lady to win elective office and the first
woman to win a statewide election in New York. Senator Clinton had always been a
controversial figure, both in New York and across the country. As an active First Lady
she acted contrary to perceptions of the proper role of a First Lady. Despite this
controversial background an active first lady, Senator Clinton went on to become an
unofficial leader of the Senate Democrats.

53

Committee/Legislative Performance
As a public figure and former first lady, Hillary Clinton came into the Senate with
expectations that her primary focus would be education, health care and child welfare
issues. She was a self-proclaimed moderate and had already done much on domestic
issues such as health care and social spending. However, in order to be a leader more is
required than a reputation and media prominence. To ascend, a Senator requires a
powerful committee assignment and a record of effective legislating.
In the Senate all committees are ranked by their power and prestige. The most
prestigious are the “Super-A” committees, followed by the A and B and then C
committees. According to Democratic rules, Super A committees include the Finance,
Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Commerce Committees (Senate
Committees). Freshman Senators do not usually acquire seats on a Super-A committee
immediately. For Hillary Clinton, it took two years before she obtained a seat on the
Armed Services Committee. Clinton, understanding the power of committee
assignments, surprised many when she sought a seat on the Senate Appropriations
Committee early on. Both insider media and mainstream media reported that her rise as
an unofficial leader in the Senate began to take shape approximately two and half years
into her term. This suggests that her powerful committee assignment may have had a part
in her rise as an unofficial leader of the Senate Democrats.
Given her powerful committee assignment on the Senate Armed Services
Committee, it is important to examine her success in committee and as a legislator in the
107th Congress when she served on the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee. The average sponsored bill pass rate for a Democrat on the committee was
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16%, Clinton’s was 12%. In the 108th Congress Clinton’s rate as compared to her
Democratic Colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee was once again lower
than the average, 13% as compared to an average of 20%. These results can be
misleading though since she is a new member on the committee and her lack of seniority
is likely to adversely affect the amount of influence she can wield on legislative bill
passage in committee. Despite the previous lackluster figures, veteran Senator Robert
Byrd (D-WV) has on occasion called Clinton a “workhorse” as opposed a “showhorse”
(Harris, 2002). Additionally, the mainstream and insider media have both reported that
she is a major player and unofficial leader of the Senate Democrats. To examine how she
is leading the Democrats in the Senate, it is useful to examine two specific initiatives that
she led in the Senate: funding homeland security and extending unemployment benefits.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 Senator Clinton has been a
prominent voice on Homeland Security among Democrats. She repeatedly pushed for
increased funding, proposing $7 Billion in grants for first responders in early 2003.
Following her proposal, the Senate compromised and settled on a similar proposal that
provided for $3.5 Billion in grants (Kady II, 2003). Besides New York, Clinton has
continually pushed for increased homeland security spending and protection for other
American cities. In January 2003, Clinton said “We have relied on a myth of homeland
security, a myth written in rhetoric, inadequate resources and a new bureaucracy instead
of relying on good old-fashioned American ingenuity, might and muscle” (Hicks, 2003).
At the conference where she made that proclamation, she announced a four point plan for
security issues that included establishing a task force of public officials and business
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leaders to create security standards for various industries and the creating of a “counterterror technology fund” (Hicks, 2003).
Her work on homeland security moved her legislative career forward by
reinforcing her credibility as a moderate with expertise on issues of security and national
defense. Up until that point she had been known for her work and expertise on domestic
issues, namely health care and children’s issues. Her work on issues perceived to be
traditionally less female such as terrorism and national security, helped establish her
credibility as a legislator that could work on a diverse range of issues. As with the other
female leaders, her ability to address traditionally male issues was vital to her ascendance
as an unofficial leader. By working on national security as a front runner, she was able to
assert and establish her leadership among the Senate Democrats.
The second issue, the extension of unemployment benefits during the recession of
the early parts of President Bush’s first term also helped to establish her credibility.
Working with Republican Senator Don Nickles, Senator Clinton proposed an extension
of unemployment benefits to the 750,000 people poised to lose them in January of 2003
(Swindell, 2002). Drawing on the economic record of the Clinton administration, she led
the attack on the Bush administration on the issue of unemployment benefits, saying “In
the recession of the early 90s, we increased benefits five times. Today, our
unemployment rate has soared to 6%, and Congress and the President have extended
benefits only once – and once is not enough” (2002)
By taking a leadership role on the issue of extending unemployment benefits
Clinton asserted her role as an unofficial leader among the Senate Democrats. On this
key issue for Democrats, who were attempting to attack Bush on his economic record,
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many Senators coalesced around Clinton’s proposal. Not only was Clinton taking a
leadership role among the Democrats, she worked with Republican Senator Nickles to
gain bipartisan support for the bill, further demonstrating her skill as a legislator and
credibility as a leader, especially since she was able to obtain passage of a similar
proposal of hers passed again in January 2004 (Downey, 2004).
While Clinton gained credibility for her ability to reach across ideological lines,
the issue of extending unemployment benefits was not as clearly beneficial in helping
transcend gender obstacles. Unlike terrorism and national security, the issue of
unemployment benefits is not exactly a male or female issue. As an economic issue it
has male attributes, but as a social and poverty related issue it has female attributes.
Thus, while Clinton may have gained credibility for her ability to hold together a diverse
coalition through her work on extending unemployment benefits, the issue was not one
that allowed her to gain credibility on male issues.
On March 5th 2003 the Washington Post published an article entitled “Clinton
Develops Into a Force in the Senate” (VandeHei, A, 2003). That article was published
shortly after her work on the first extension of jobless benefits and reflects the transition
she made when she was able to assert her leadership on that bill. The assertion of
leadership was among the first signs of her ascendancy and relied not only on her
bipartisan work and political leadership but also on her work on homeland security. Her
work on homeland security established her reputation as a hard working moderate and
gave her the credibility to overcome gender barriers that remained and ascend to a
position of unofficial leadership among the Senate Democrats.

57

Ideology
As discussed earlier, differences between the House and Senate would affect the
impact of ideology on the selection of leaders. As an institution the Senate rules and
culture place a larger emphasis on compromise than the rules and culture of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, I hypothesized that the Senate would be more likely to
choose a Senator based on the middleman or policy deviant theory since both of those
theories are based on the emergence of a leader through ideological compromise. That
said, Senator Clinton claims herself to be a moderate “New Democrat,” and a member of
the Democratic Leadership Council. As a self-proclaimed “New Democrat” she came
with the expectation of moderation and she did not disappoint, the ideological data shows
her to be generally in the middle of her party.
Viewing her ideology in the context of three theories, the first one with which to
compare her scores is the middleman or median voter theory. Of the 48 Senators she
served with in the 107th and 108th Senates she, on average, ranked as the 17th most liberal.
In this calculation I did not count the LCCR scores since over half the Senate Democrats
of the 107th and 108th Democrats scored a perfect 100 and the measure was therefore not
highly discriminating. The median voter theory is therefore a closer predictor of the
ideological forces behind the ascendance of Clinton than of any of the House leaders
studied thus far, but being ranked 17th when the median is between 24th and 25th makes
the ranking far from satisfactory.
The policy deviant model posits that when determining the relevant median voter
in a leadership election, those Senators that lie far out of the mainstream would not be
counted in determining the median ideology. To apply the policy deviant model to
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Clinton’s ascendancy it is first necessary to determine which Senators are policy deviants
and should be eliminated. Since the LCCR scores are not useful for the Senate they will
not be a factor in these determinations. Nor shall the Poole-Rosenthal rankings be used
since the scores utilized by this paper are the ranking of Senators and thus do not measure
the magnitude of differences between Senators. That leaves the AFL-CIO and ACU
scores as the determinant of policy deviancy.
The ACU ratings increase smoothly from the most liberal Senator, Sen. Boxer (DCA) and increases by no more than 3 points from one Senator to the next until it reaches
the 44th most liberal Senator, Sen. Pryor (D-AR) when it increases by 8, from 22 to 30.
This leads me to conclude that the policy deviants are those ranked 44th and lower in their
ratings. Eliminating those, Clinton moves from being ranked 21st among 48 to 21st
among 42 according to the ACU and places her almost directly into the median. Utilizing
the AFL-CIO scores, the median score is a 90 and the highest possible rating is 100. So,
if we thus count as every Senator with a rating from 80 to 100 (equidistant points from
90) as being in the mainstream, we eliminate the Senators ranked 39th or lower. Clinton
then moves from being ranked 12th among 48 to 12th among 39, or four positions closer
to the median. On average then, both scores come closer to the median when the deviants
are removed. The data shows that the policy deviant model is more accurate when
compared to the median voter model and better in describing the ideological forces
behind Clinton’s ascendancy.
Because of the nature of the utility maximizing theory it is hard to conclusively
discount it as an explanation for the ascendancy of Clinton even though there is evidence
that the policy deviant model is accurate. This is especially true in this case since the
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utility maximizing theory can work in combination with two previous theories. There
appear to be utilitarian advantages to selecting Clinton as a leader. However, since her
ascendancy was gradual and involved no decisive event such as an election there is no
definitive commentary from her fellow Senators on the impact of apparent utilitarian
advantages she could have presented to the party. For example, her ability to fundraise
is, of course, a well documented advantage to picking her. Gender, though is not as clear
an advantage since her fame and prestige existed before she arrived in the Senate and
thus any utility her gender could have provided to the party was already there. The effect
of the prestige of being a former First Lady could also provide a utilitarian advantage, but
ascertaining the magnitude of the advantage is difficult.
In summary, the policy deviant model seems to be the clearest descriptor of the
impact of ideology on the ascendance of Clinton. Despite that, it is impossible to
discount or assess the impact of the utility maximization theory. The removal of policy
deviants led to the selection of a leader who was very close to the median, suggesting that
the policy deviant model is correct. Yet, the impact of gender and fundraising had
unclear levels of influence on the ascendancy of Clinton, which prohibits the drawing of
any definitive conclusions on the relative importance of the utility maximizing theory.
An additional difficulty faced in the study of the utility maximizing theory is the lack of a
defining moment in her ascendancy such as an election. When an election occurs there is
ample reporting in the insider and conventional media on the important factors in the
ascendancy of the leader. Without this decisive event, there are fewer explicit
discussions of reasons other Senators would support Clinton as an unofficial leader in the
US Senate.
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Fundraising
Senator Clinton is a top fundraiser for the party, which is consistent with my
earlier findings. Unlike Pelosi and DeLauro, though, Clinton’s election was not assured,
forcing her to raise significant sums of money for herself before she could contribute to
other Democratic candidates. Her campaign spent over $40 Million in the race against
first Rudy Giuliani and then Rep. Rick Lazio (R-NY). In addition to that, her leadership
PAC “HillPac” has raised millions for fellow Democrats (Tomasky, 2001; VandeHei, A,
2003).
Given her prestige and connections from her days in the White House, Clinton’s
fundraising prowess came as a surprise to no one. In the first two years of her Senate
term alone, she raised approximately $1.4 million for other Senate candidates. At
$500,000 per plate fundraisers and on her national book tour she is raising vast sums of
money for Democrats. By raising these large sums of money Clinton is able to accrue the
prestige and support that goes along with being “good for the party” (VandeHei, A,
2003). By raising large sums of money for the party organization as well as specific
Democratic candidates, Clinton increases her support among fellow Democratic Senators.

Gender
Clinton (2003), in her autobiography (Clinton, 2003), notes the existence of what
she calls a “double bind.” She was torn between the constraints of the traditional roles of
First Lady, wife and mother and the roles of policy maker and political figure. Unlike
other women in this study, Clinton had already collided with Congress previously and

61

brought the issue of gender to the forefront. When she chaired the task force on health
care, Mary Ellen Guy (1995) wrote about the challenges Clinton faced when confronting
Congress over the issue of health care. The gendered nature of Congress, the health care
profession and the role expectations of the first lady made Clinton’s foray into health care
policy a difficult and turbulent one. For example, Guy notes how male members of
Congress and the male doctors and CEOs who run the health care industry marginalized
and discounted the views and efforts of Clinton.
Hillary Clinton is unique in that she encountered the difficulties women typically
face when confronting a gendered institution such as Congress before she was elected to
Congress. Even during Clinton’s Senate campaign, feminist Gloria Steinem (2000) wrote
about how Clinton was receiving (in her opinion unfair) criticism from feminists and
non-feminists alike for a perceived attempt to use the prestige of her husband to gain
election and political gain for herself. According to Steinem (2000), Clinton’s credentials
qualifications to serve as a Senator were often overlooked in the face of criticism.
Certainly, she pointed out, fewer people criticized George W. Bush for what could have
been perceived as an attempt to use the prestige and connections of his father to run for
President.
By remaining in the spotlight and ever so vocal on issues of public policy, Clinton
was able to transition from outsider status to insider status within the halls of Congress.
She had already confronted the “double bind” of gender stereotypes and moved beyond
them. Clinton tackled masculine issues such as health care and homeland security before
she was able to fully transition to being an insider and ascend into the leadership. Her
fundraising ability and political skills bolstered her credibility and facilitated her
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ascendancy by allowing Clinton to transition to insider status in Congress. I think
Clinton summed up the gender challenges she faced best in her autobiography when she
wrote “It was becoming clear to me that people who wanted me to fit into a certain box,
traditionalist or feminist would never be entirely satisfied with as me as me” (2003).
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“I can’t picture Harry [Reid] on the Sunday morning shows every Sunday. I don’t think
that’s his strength. His real strength is inside baseball, knowing the Senate, knowing the
procedures.”
– Sen. Joseph Biden, 2004

Harry Reid

Harry Reid’s political career began in 1971 Reid when he ran for Lt. Governor on
a ticket with his political mentor and former high school gym teacher Jim O’Callaghan.
Reid won the race for Lt. Governor and in 1974 Reid ran for the US Senate against
Republican Paul Laxalt and lost. Following the loss, O’Callaghan named Reid as
chairman of the Nevada Gaming Commission at a time when organized crime heavily
influenced the gaming industry. In 1999 Reid described the experience, saying “they
puts bombs on my car, there were threatening phone calls at night, people tried to bribe
me and went to jail.” Throughout his chairmanship Reid won a reputation for having, as
Parade Magazine called it “integrity and guts.”
In 1982 Reid left the Nevada Gaming Commission to pursue the equally vicious,
though less violent, Washington politics. That year he ran for and won a seat in the
House of Representatives, where he served for four years. In 1986, Reid ran for and won
the Senate Seat he had lost in 1974. As a Senator he became known for his toughness,
congeniality, and mastery of floor procedure. He became known as a moderate and a
fierce fighter after his work on the Yucca nuclear storage facility. The reputation he

64

developed through his work led to his election as Senate Minority Whip and ultimately
his election as Senate Democratic Leader in 2004.

Committee/Legislative Performance
For Sen. Reid, or any Senator, to ascend he or she must demonstrate their
legislative skills. Unlike women in the Senate, Sen. Reid was not under the same
pressure to excel in traditionally male areas such as foreign policy and defense.
Nonetheless, he had to prove himself as an individual Senator among the larger assembly.
To prove himself he secured membership on the Senate Appropriations Committee and
used that position to achieve legislative success. Through his legislative work, most
prominently, his work on nuclear waste disposal on Yucca Mountain, he has been able to
demonstrate his legislative skills.
Senator Reid, prior to ascending to Senate Democratic Leader, served on the
Senate Appropriations Committee, which has the highest ranking that could be given to a
Senate committee, it is a Super-A committee. Serving on a Super-A committee provides
a Senator with a high level of influence and prestige corresponding with the power and
prestige of a Super-A committee. While serving on the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Reid chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Energy
and Public Works.
In addition to a powerful and prestigious committee assignment it is also
necessary to demonstrate legislative skill and political acumen. Of the Democrats that
served with him on the Senate Appropriations Committee in the 107th and 108th
Congresses (2000 – 2004), Reid ranked 4th out of 15 in the proportion of bills he
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sponsored that passed the Senate. This high ranking provides evidence that in addition to
a powerful and prestigious committee assignment Reid also possessed the necessary level
of political and legislative skill to ascend. While the ranking does provide evidence of
political and legislative skill it is necessary to examine prominent cases of his legislative
work to provide further insight into Reid’s level of legislative skill. To gain further
insight into Reid’s work as a legislator I will examine his work on the Yucca Mountain
nuclear disposal plan, and his work on abortion since his position on abortion rights has
attracted a great deal of attention with respect to his ascendancy.
Though Reid lost the battle to stop nuclear waste from being shipped to a facility
in Nevada, Reid’s colleagues in the Senate were impressed by the effort. Sen. Torricelli
(D-NJ), who voted with Sen. Reid even though New Jersey depends heavily on nuclear
power, said “there’s enormous feeling for Harry Reid within the party” (Murray, 2002).
Furthermore, President Clinton’s former Chief of Staff and lobbyist for Nevada, John
Podesta, said if it weren’t for Senator Reid “I don’t think we’d have 10 votes” (Murray,
2002). While Reid may have lost the battle, demonstrated he had the skills necessary to
ascend into the leadership.
The issue of nuclear waste disposal came to the forefront on July 9th, 2002 when
the Senate voted to enact a plan that had been in preparation for 20 years. The plan was
to ship nuclear waste from sites all over the country to a central repository in Yucca
Mountain, which is within 100 miles of Las Vegas and the California border. After Bush
endorsed the plan the Governor of Nevada exercised his option of vetoing the plan after
which the House and Senate could override the veto of the Governor (McCutcheon, E,
2002). In the summer of 2002, Reid went to work to prevent the Senate from overriding
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the decision of Nevada’s Governor. Since many other Senators and their constituents
wanted the waste out of sites in their state the battle to prevent the shipping of waste to
the Yucca facility would not be easy.
Reid used a combination of personal persuasion and parliamentary maneuvering
to turn a long shot into a fairly close vote. Using personal persuasion he was able to
increase support for his cause by discussing the potential for terrorist attacks on the large
amounts of nuclear materials being shipped across the country. Reid’s speech to a
Democratic lunch before the vote was noted by the media as being critical to persuading
colleagues on the fence, such as Sen. Stabenow (D-MI) to join him (Murray, 2002).
Politically, his use of other issues and the structuring of the final vote allowed him to
come away with a respectable defeat. Reid’s position as Senate Minority Whip gave him
considerable influence over other Senators’ bills which he was able to wield in the fight
against the establishment of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site. Reid used his
support for Ethanol and Amtrak to attract support from Midwesterners and Easterners.
When the final vote came, Reid structured the vote to give him a respectable defeat, since
he knew he did not have the votes to win. He structured the final vote so that the only
recorded vote was a procedural vote that would allow the Senate to vote on overturning
Nevada’s decision. This allowed Senators to support Reid and vote with him on the
procedural vote and then vote against him in an unrecorded voice vote on the actual
proposal. By letting Senators have it both ways Reid was able to give himself a
respectable defeat without alienating many of his colleagues (Murray, 2002).
In addition to his efforts on the issue of nuclear waste disposal, Reid had received
a great deal of attention for his position and work on the issue of abortion rights. The
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issue of abortion has always been prominent in debates over the ascendancy of Sen. Reid
who opposes abortion rights while the majority of Democrats in Congress support
abortion. As a Senator, Reid supported a non-binding resolution opposing Roe v. Wade
as well as the “Partial Birth Abortion” ban and has made no secret of his opposition to
legalized abortion (Wallsten and Curtius, 2004). The ascendance of Reid raised the issue
of his position on choice to the forefront. Some Democratic leaders, such as Rep. Pelosi
supported Sen. Reid despite their disagreement over choice, citing instead his
considerable legislative skill. Other supporters of the Democratic party committed to
preserving abortion rights, such as Gloria Feldt, the President of Planned Parenthood,
opposed the ascendance of a leader against abortion rights (Wallsten and Curtius, 2004;
Feldmann, 2005).
Despite his opposition to a position held by most Democrats in Congress, Reid
has not alienated his colleagues. For example, Sen. Boxer (D-CA) is amongst his closest
allies despite her pro-choice position. Reid has been able to ascend because he can hold
together ideologically diverse coalitions within a party in which he is one of the more
conservative members. For example, the vote on Yucca demonstrated Reid’s ability to
retain a position in opposition to most other Democrats but still hold together an
ideologically diverse coalition to accomplish legislative goals. While there is no single
bill that is definitive in terms of his work on abortion, it is important to note that his work
on abortion has not alienated his colleagues and inhibited his ability to achieve legislative
success.
To ascend into the leadership a Senator requires placement on a powerful
committee and a legacy of legislative success. By securing a seat on the Senate

68

Appropriations Committee, a Super-A committee, Reid was able to obtain the committee
placement needed to ascend. His demonstrated skill from his work on the Yucca facility
was also necessary for him to ascend. His work on Yucca displayed his ability to use
personal persuasion and Senate floor procedure to achieve legislative success.
Importantly, his legislative success came despite his disagreement with most Democrats
over the issue of abortion rights.

Ideology
Harry Reid is ideologically to the right of the median Senate Democrat. The
extent and influence of ideological factors, such as his relative conservatism as compared
to fellow Senate Democrats, will once again be measured using the median voter, policy
deviant, and utility maximizing theories. The median voter theory suggests that the
elected leader should be the Senator with an ideology that is the median among the
Senate Democrats voting for the leader. This is not the case for Senator Reid. Among
the Democratic Senators that served in the 107th and 108th Congress the Poole-Rosenthal
ranking places Reid as the 35th most liberal Senator among the 48 Democratic Senators,
the AFL-CIO ranked Reid 24th and the ACU ranked Reid as 40th out of 48. Once again
the LCCR scores were not taken into account since the majority of Democratic Senators
scored a perfect 100 according to the LCCR. On average, Reid was the 33rd most liberal
Senator out of 48. Harry Reid on average does not come close to being on the ideological
median, and thus the median voter theory cannot be an accurate descriptor of Reid’s
ascendance to Senate Democratic Leader.
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For Sen. Clinton, the policy deviant model was fairly accurate in describing the
ideological conditions in her ascendancy. The same, however, cannot be said for Sen.
Reid. Sen. Reid is more conservative than the median Senator, so by applying the policy
deviant model more conservative Democrats than liberal Democrats are eliminated,
pushing Reid farther to the right of the median. For example, if we apply the policy
deviant model to the ACU scores the same way we did for Sen. Clinton, Reid moves
from being 40th of 48 to the 40th of 42. If we apply the model to the AFL-CIO scores in
the same way we applied it to Sen. Clinton, Sen. Reid then moves from being 24th of 48
to 24th of 39.
In this case, both the middleman and policy deviant models are inadequate in
describing the ascendancy of Reid. Instead there are utilitarian advantages to electing
Reid as leader. The existence and dominance of utilitarian factors in the ascendance of
Reid makes the utility maximizing theory a plausible descriptor of Reid’s election as
Senate Minority Leader. Unlike the leaders studied thus far, Reid was not likely to attract
women to the party in large numbers. The reality is that Reid’s utilitarian advantage
comes in his attracting moderates from Republican states, commanding the floor of the
Senate, and raising large sums of money.
The election of 2004 left many Democratic Senators and strategists concerned
that Democrats were perceived as being weaker on “values” and unable to connect to
middle-America. Sen. Reid was often supported as a cultural moderate who could
combat the perception that Democrats were weaker than Republicans on “values” issues
such as abortion and gay marriage (Stolberg, 2005). As fellow Senator, and ardent Reid
supporter, Barbara Boxer (D-CA) said “I believe very strongly that the moderates of our
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caucus ought to have some sway. I have noticed in the past that all the gravitas has
slipped to the left. All one has to do is look at the map to know that you can’t win a
presidential election that way” (2004). Her views are typical of the many Senators who
overwhelmingly supported Reid in his drive to become Senate Democratic Leader. For
sure there were some liberal members of the party that seemed to view Reid’s moderation
as unattractive. Most other Senate Democrats felt that elevating a moderate from a
Republican state would provide the utilitarian gain of an electoral advantage for the
Democrats nationally.
As a floor leader, Reid is known to spend more time on the floor than almost any
other Senator and to have strong command of the archaic and complex Senate rules
(Nagourney and Hulse, 2004). For example, during the battle over the Yucca Mountain
nuclear waste disposal proposal Reid demonstrated both his command of parliamentary
procedure and his personal persuasion skills to surprise many with the closeness of his
defeat. By impressing his colleagues with his legislative skills, Reid asserted to them that
electing him as leader would provide utilitarian gain in the form of greater legislative
success.
In addition to his other utilitarian advantages Reid has also established himself as
a top fundraiser among the Senate Democrats. While I will go into further detail into
Reid’s fundraising later on, it is important to note that his PAC fund, the Searchlight
Leadership Fund, has raised a great deal of money for fellow Senate candidates. By
raising large sums of money for the party Reid created a utilitarian advantage to electing
him leader in the form of increased fundraising.
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In summary, the utility maximizing theory of leadership selection once again
appears to be the most accurate descriptor of the rise of a contemporary congressional
Democrat. Sen. Reid is not on the ideological median, so the median voter theory cannot
describe his ascendancy. He is further off the median when the policy deviant model is
applied, so the policy deviant model cannot describe his ascendance. The advantages he
could provides in electoral attractiveness of the party to moderates, floor leadership and
fundraising, however, provided the utilitarian advantage he needed to be elected leader.

Fundraising
Of the utilitarian advantages related to electing Sen. Reid as leader, fundraising
was among the most prominent. Though, while Reid did raise significant sums of money
prior to his ascendance, he did not raise as much as other leaders such as Sen. Clinton and
his predecessor Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD). Reid’s PAC, the Searchlight Leadership
Fund, raised $574,000 in the 2004 cycle and in both the 2002 and 2004 cycle distributed
approximately $300,000 to other Democratic candidates (Kane, 2005). While that is a
large sum of money, it does not compete with Clinton’s PAC, HillPAC, or Sen. Daschle’s
(Reid’s predecessor) DASHPAC. In 2004 Daschle’s DashPAC contributed
approximately $560,000 candidates despite his being a highly endangered incumbent.
Reid’s pace of fundraising, according to Roll Call is increasing and should match or
exceed expectations of his fundraising abilities as Democratic Leader (Kane, 2005). By
raising large sums of money and proving that he could continue to raise even more
money Reid satisfied a necessary condition for ascendance, being a top fundraiser.
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Gender
Thus far I have contended that female leaders, in order to transition to insider
status, must prove their competence in traditionally masculine issue areas such as defense
and foreign policy. The other side of that argument is that there is less pressure on men
to prove themselves in those areas. In this case, Sen. Reid is not as well known for
foreign policy and defense issues as he is on domestic issues such as social security
reform and the environment. While female leaders have had to do more to distinguish
themselves in traditionally male areas, Reid has not established his reputation on the basis
of issues that are traditionally masculine, and as a male has not suffered as a result.
When Sen. Reid and Rep. Pelosi gave the response to President Bush’s State of The
Union Address in February 2005, it was Pelosi who spoke on national security, while
Reid spoke about social security and domestic budget issues instead.
The appropriations process is still to some extent male dominated and the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees are still considered traditionally male committees.
Social security, social spending, and the environment, though, do not have the explicitly
masculine characteristics possessed by issues such as national security and defense. Reid
and DeLauro, in that sense, both did not focus as intensely on traditionally male issues
the same way Pelosi and Clinton did. Yet, Reid ascended much more like Pelosi than
DeLauro. That suggests that issues inhibiting DeLauro’s ascendancy, and accelerating
Pelosi’s ascendancy - their ability to use traditionally masculine issues to transition to
insiders did not affect Reid. He did not have to focus on male issues to transition and
was thus not affected the same way DeLauro was by his choice of traditionally nonmasculine issues.
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Conclusion

This thesis aims to answer basic questions about leadership and women in
Congress. Most prominent among those questions is what factors enable or inhibit
members of Congress, specifically women, from ascending in Congress? In answering
that question, the paper seeks to examine the ascendancy of four Democratic leaders
through the lens of theories relating leadership ascendancy and gender in Congress. By
examining committee placement and performance, ideology, fundraising, and gender it is
possible to identify commonalities among Democratic leaders. Based on those
commonalities, we can assess the influence of certain variables on the success of
leadership ascendancy and test test the validity of the theories.
The subjects of this case study have all ascended in different ways and with
different degrees of success. Of the leaders, Sen. Reid and Rep. Pelosi rose with the least
setbacks as compared to Sen. Clinton, who faced moderate difficulty then and Rep.
DeLauro, who faced the most difficulty in her ascendancy. Sen. Reid and Rep. Pelosi
both steadily ascended to their current positions by possessing several positions of
leadership before becoming Democratic Leaders of their respective chambers. For
example, both served as Democratic Whip in their respective chamber before becoming
leader. Furthermore, both won election as leader with a strong majority. They have
earned credibility and insider status to such a degree that their ability to lead was not in
question. They won election and leadership posts without as many setbacks as the other
leaders in this comparative case study.
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While Reid and Pelosi ascended smoothly after climbing several successive rungs
up the Congressional ladder, Clinton and DeLauro faced more difficulties. Sen. Clinton
faced skepticism and the perception that some of her colleagues might not take her desire
to legislate seriously. Particularly after her collision with Congress over health care,
Clinton was a controversial figure in Congress and she had to overcome perceptions that
she was a “showhorse” in the Senate and prove that she was a “workhorse.” Over time,
she took on masculine issues, legislated effectively and earned the credibility and respect
needed to ascend. DeLauro, on the other hand did not focus on masculine issues as much
and thus had a more difficult time transitioning to insider status. Unlike Pelosi and Reid,
DeLauro faced several defeats in her attempts to ascend up the Congressional ladder,
losing two races for Democratic Caucus Chair.
The nature of the ascendance of the leaders in question can be related to the
variables being studied. In some cases, variables like committee and legislative
performance as well as fundraising ability were strong predictors for leadership
ascendancy. All four legislators had seats on powerful and prestigious committees and
reputations for legislative skills. Their legislative skills and proven ability to hold
together ideologically diverse coalitions was related to their ability to establish their
credibility and effective leaders. Additionally, all the leaders proved themselves as
skilled and prolific fundraisers. Fundraising prowess helps build a base of support and is
necessary to prove that one’s leadership will be good for the party.
In terms of ideology, there was little commonality. While, DeLauro and Pelosi
tended to be to the left of the median, Clinton was a centrist and Reid was to the right of
the median. Only Clinton came close to possibly validating a theory of ideology other
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than the utility maximizing theory. Utilitarian advantages in the form of attracting
various constituencies, such as women, to the party, and fundraising were critical the
leader’s ascendance.
Gender also affected the ascendance of all four leaders differently. The difference
in how gender affected the ascendance of the leaders varied according to their approach
to legislative work and priorities. Women leaders who focused on masculine issues were
able to gain credibility and more easily make the transition to insider status. DeLauro,
for example, was not able to focus on male issues as much as Pelosi and Clinton and thus
had a more difficult ascendance than Pelosi and Clinton. On the other hand, Reid
focused little on issues that are traditionally male, yet has experienced a very successful
ascendance. To get a full appreciation, though, for the nature of the relationship between
the selected variable and leadership ascendancy it is necessary to examine them in closer
detail.

Nancy Pelosi
The first case study presented was that of Nancy Pelosi. As I mentioned earlier,
Pelosi’s ascendance has been a smooth and successful one which can be related to the
variables and hypotheses presented. In her legislative work she possessed all the
necessary conditions for ascendance. She served on the powerful House Appropriations
Committee and House Select Intelligence Committee. Furthermore she chaired the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee. The influence and prestige she
accumulated on committee is matched by the data concerning her sponsored bill pass
rate. Among the 30 Democrats that served with Pelosi on the House Appropriations
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Committee in the 107th and 108th Pelosi’s pass rate for sponsored bill was 2nd. Pelosi’s
ability to work with and get bills passed with an ideologically diverse coalition and party
was also essential. Leading an ideologically diverse coalition on the issue of trade with
China is one example of how she was able to prove she could lead a diverse caucus on
important issues. As a top fundraiser in the House of Representatives, she satisfied the
necessary condition of being a talented fundraiser, raising millions for the party.
Pelosi, though, faced challenges as a woman entering Congress. In order to
overcome those challenges she had to transition from outside to insider status, and to do
that she would need to prove herself on traditionally male issues. Pelosi’s ascent was
among the most successful of the cases studied because of the success with which she
addressed traditionally masculine issues such as defense and international relations.
Pelosi received a great deal of attention for her work on terrorism when she pushed for
the 9/11 commission and international relations when she confronted the issue of trade
with China. Following her transition to insider status gender turned to more of an asset
than a liability. Pelosi became a symbol for those who thought women should have a
greater voice in the Democratic Party and in Congress. That energy helped propel Pelosi
forward into key leadership posts.
Ideologically, neither the median voter nor the policy deviant model could explain
Pelosi’s election as House Minority Leader. Not only was Pelosi not in the ideological
median position, but the application of the policy deviant model would have pushed her
even farther away from the median position. The remaining, and most accurate,
explanation is the utility maximizing model. Pelosi’s ability to attract women to the party
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and raise large sums of money provided utilitarian advantages that propelled Pelosi into
the leadership despite how she is more liberal than most of her colleagues.

Rosa DeLauro
The factor most differentiating DeLauro from the other case studies is gender. By
not sustaining the focus on traditionally male issues that Pelosi and Clinton did, DeLauro
faced difficulties in overcoming her initial outsider status. Her focus on traditionally
female issues such as children’s issues, gun control, and abortion rights made it difficult
for her to overcome the stereotyping and marginalization that women often confront. As
a result she had difficulties in ascending. Though gender did assist her ascendance at
some points, such as when she was invited to run for Assistant to the Democratic Leader,
it often inhibited her ascendance. DeLauro’s experience indicates two things: focus on
masculine issues is important and that gender can work both as a accelerator and inhibitor
for women that have at least partially transitioned to insider status.
Nonetheless, she possessesed all the other necessary conditions to ascend. With
respect to fundraising, she built on her work in EMILY’s List, DeLauro raised the large
sums of money needed to ascend in Congress. With respect to legislative and committee
work she fulfilled the necessary condition of serving on a powerful committee, the House
Appropriations Committee. While on that committee she achieved legislative success
and credibility in policy areas such as abortion, and gun control. Her legislative success
in those areas is noteworthy but lacked the emphasis on traditionally masculine issues to
allow DeLauro to transition to insider status.
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Being more liberal than the median representative, the median vote theory could
not explain her ascendance as an official and unofficial leader. Furthermore, the extent of
her liberalness makes it so that the application of the policy deviant model causes her to
move even farther off the median. The policy deviant model could therefore not be an
accurate descriptor of her ascendance. The remaining, and most plausible explanation, is
then the utility maximizing model. By leading on an issue popular among women voters,
gun control, and raising large sums of money DeLauro possessed critical utilitarian
advantages to her ascendance.

Hillary Clinton
When Hillary Clinton arrived in the Senate there was little doubt about her ability
to raise money. With the prestige and connections of a First Lady, she would raise the
money needed to ascend without much difficulty. The difficulty for Clinton would be
overcoming the challenges of gender and demonstrating the willingness and ability to
work with the Democratic caucus. While Clinton never obtained a high bill passage rate,
and only recently obtained a seat on a Super-A committee she has demonstrated
legislative skill. Her legislative skills were exhibited when she worked with ideologically
diverse colleagues on the issues of terrorism, homeland security, and the extension of
unemployment benefits. By leading an ideologically diverse coalition of both Democrats
and Republicans, she demonstrated her skill and established the legislative credibility to
ascend to a position of unofficial leadership.
Clinton was able to overcome the obstacles of gender through her membership on
a traditionally masculine committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee and her work
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on traditionally male issues. Both prior to, and during her service on the Senate Armed
Services Committee she was vocal on the issue of terrorism and homeland security. By
working on traditionally male committees and the above issues Clinton transitioned to
insider status and ascended to unofficial leadership among the Senate Democrats.
The most unique aspect of Clinton’s case study is her ideology. While none of
the other case studies demonstrated any evidence of the validity of the median voter
theory or policy deviant model, Clinton’s case study seems to closely follow the
predictions of the policy deviant mode. While this does not necessitate that the policy
deviant model applies, since it is impossible to determine if the cause of Clinton’s rise is
the policy deviant model or utility maximizing model, it is unique in that it is at least
possible to apply the policy deviant model.

Harry Reid
As the only male in the case study Harry Reid provides a point of comparison for
gender issues in ascendance. Like the women in the case study, Reid sat on a powerful
committee, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and was noted for his legislative skill,
particularly with respect to the Senate rules. While Reid was not as effective a fundraiser
as Pelosi or Clinton, he was a talented fundraiser and thus joined the women in the case
study as a successful fund raiser for the party. Reid diverged from the women in the
relationship between his legislative work and his ascendance. While the women had to
establish credibility in male dominated policy areas to ascend, Reid was able to ascend
with far less a focus on traditionally male issues. For example, DeLauro’s ascendance
was made more difficult due to her concentration on such traditionally feminine issues as
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children’s welfare and poverty alleviation. Pelosi’s ascendance was helped by her
expertise on such traditionally male issues as terrorism and national security. Yet Reid’s
ascendance was not inhibited by his minimal focus on traditionally male issues.
The other divergence Reid makes is from Sen. Clinton is on the issue of gender.
While Clinton’s ideology indicated the possibility of the policy deviant model being
applicable, Reid’s model provides no such evidence. He is among the more conservative
Senate Democrats and the application of the median voter theory and the policy deviant
model is not consistent with Reid’s ascendance. Instead, there appears to have been other
utilitarian advantages to electing Reid as the Democratic Leader. According to his
colleagues, his ability to attract moderates to the party and achieve legislative success
appear to have been prime factors in his ascension.

Final Thoughts
This study does not claim to provide conclusive empirical truths or be the
definitive study of leadership and gender in Congress. Instead, it aims to take the first set
of prominent women leaders in Congress and examine their ascendancy as a way of
getting a preliminary perspective on the applicability of theories of gender and
leadership. It is impossible to state that this study has covered all the sufficient variables
to ascend, however, utilizing the comparative case study format we can, therefore, draw
important lessons about the necessary conditions to ascend in Congress. This study could
then begin to develop a broader base of scholarship in the field based on observation and
empiricism.
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That said, the results of this study do not yield all the answers, but rather can form
the basis of future questions. When there is a critical mass of female leaders within
Congress, a more quantitative empirical investigation of gender and leadership could and
should be attempted. For now, it is necessary to acknowledge several limitations
imposed by the format of the study and nature of the subjects being studied. First and
foremost, the n is insufficient to makes conclusive generalizations. There simply are not
enough women in positions of leadership in Congress. Second, I was unable to directly
interview the subjects of the case study or members of Congress, making the
accumulation of data secondhand and derived from a variety of sources. Third, the study
only studied Democrats. Two factors affected the decision to study Democratic leaders:
the greater number of women leaders in the Democratic Party and the differences that
exist between the parties. Since differences between the parties (for example culture,
ideology, and majority/minority status) would make a comparison between Democratic
and Republican leaders difficult I selected the party with the most women to choose from
and studied only that party.
There still remain numerous questions to be answered concerning this field of
research. Future research in this field might consider: Is the ratio of bills sponsored to
bills passed is a useful measure of legislative skill? Is there an empirical correlation
between that and leadership ascendancy within Congress? What is the effect of ideology
on leadership ascendancy in the Senate? Is it primarily a function of which ideological
groups the party wishes to attract to the party or is the middleman or policy deviant
model applicable? Is there a fundraising threshold that members must cross to ascend or
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does the amount of money you raise actively affect the odds of ascending into the
leadership? Are the findings generalizable to women leaders from both parties?
In this paper, I have touched on the broad theme of leadership and leadership
ascendancy in Congress. The character of leaders that ascend and the method by which
they ascend, in Congress or any organization, speaks volumes about the character of the
institution and the ways in which the institution will behave. There is little reason to
believe that values and attitudes towards race and gender exhibited in the selection of
leaders would not manifest themselves in the laws and policies enunciated by Congress.
By beginning to uncover the changing nature of leadership and the selection of leadership
within Congress I hope, then, to inspire new questions about the changing nature of
Congress itself. To capture the changing nature of Congress I suggest that it is often
helpful to view Congress from the “top-down.” By “top-down,” I do not mean only
considering the leadership and their actions in studying Congress, but rather studying the
leadership and how they ascended as a way of gaining insight into the culture, ethos and
values of Congress. From this “top-down” perspective, we can see Congress for what it
is and the values, priorities, strengths, and weaknesses which with it tends to the business
of the people.
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